

The George Wright
FORUM

Volume 6 ♦ 1989 ♦ Number 3

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The George Wright Society

Dedicated to the Protection, Preservation and Management
of Cultural and Natural Parks and Reserves
Through Research and Education

The George Wright Society was founded August 18, 1980 by Drs. Theodore W. Sudia and Robert M. Linn, both former Chief Scientists of the U. S. National Park Service. The Society is chartered in the State of Delaware, in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware and of The United States of America, as a nonprofit educational and scientific organization dedicated to the protection, preservation and management of cultural and natural parks and reserves through research and education.

Officers and Board of Directors: Melody Webb, President; Gary E. Davis, Vice President; Lloyd Loope, Treasurer; Stephanie Toothman, Secretary; Board Directors: Jonathan W. Bayless, Susan Bratton, Kheryn Klubnikin, and Stephen D. Veirs.

FORUM Editors: Jean Matthews, Corvallis, Oregon, and William E. Brown, Santa Fe, New Mexico; Publisher, Robert M. Linn, Hancock, Michigan.

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Membership applications and other business correspondence should be sent to: The George Wright Society, P.O. Box 65, Hancock, Michigan 49930-0065 USA. Membership in The George Wright Society is open to those who are "interested in promoting the application of knowledge, understanding and wisdom to the management of the resources of natural and cultural parks, sites and equivalent reserves." Membership dues are: Regular Member, \$25 annually; Student Member, \$15 annually; Sustaining Member, \$500 annually; Life Member, \$250. Subscriptions to The George Wright FORUM only (without membership in the Society) are: Libraries, \$25; individuals, \$20. Dues, contributions and subscriptions are US tax deductible. Additional information may be obtained by writing to the Society's P.O. box.

A Call for Papers

A Society Platform for the Next Decade

November 12–17, 1990

The Westin Paso Del Norte Hotel • El Paso, Texas

Soon to be placed in the mails will be a brochure describing the nature of the upcoming 1990 Conference on Research in the National Parks and Equivalent Reserves. The brochure states the conference objectives, glimpses a few highlights, and calls for papers which deal with some aspect of the objectives. What follows is largely taken from that brochure.

Conference Objectives

1. To develop a Society platform or set of working priorities for 1990–1999, i.e., a listing of the five most critical and/or urgent threats to both cultural and natural resources as labeled by the Society forum.
2. To develop a forum position related to the cause and effect of each threat.
3. To develop a 10-year (or less) strategy by which the Society can actively contribute to the mitigation of identified threats.

The Nature of the Presentations

Oral and Poster presentations are invited which illustrate a threat or recurring problem which threatens the preservation of our cultural/natural resources. Submittals can be made in the areas of management, research, or agency/communications/organization/relationships/funding. Threats can be of national or worldwide scope. Throughout the course of the meeting, authors will serve as committee members assigned to each concurrent session. Concurrent sessions will be organized according to common themes among paper/poster submittals. Committees will synthesize the findings of each concurrent session into a defined threat, each to be prioritized by the forum for platform consideration.

.....continued on next page

What To Do First

Prospective presenters should submit in duplicate, a proposed title with a summary (100 words or less) to the following address by **February 15, 1990**. Please state preference regarding an oral or poster presentation.

Where to Send Titles with Summaries

Mail:

Tom Gavin, Conference Co-Chair
1990 George Wright Society Conference
National Park Service
450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36063
San Francisco, CA 94102

Fax:

415-556-2793
Attention: Tom Gavin

Conference Planning Schedule

After title summaries are received, instructions for abstract preparation will be mailed to presenters by May 15, 1990; abstracts then must be submitted by July 5 to be printed with the Conference agenda.

If space becomes limited, the program committee may request that some proposed oral presentations be presented in poster format.

Conference Highlights

- A forum debate/vote on the Society platform for 1990-1999.
- Working sessions related to the organization of Society sections. [See page 39 in this issue of *Forum*.]
- International Cultural Resources—at historic sites of Ciudad Juárez, and discussions of problems.
- Potential field trips to White Sands National Monument, Carlsbad Caverns National Park, Fort Davis National Historic Site, Guadalupe Mountains National Park.
- Poster session, cultural event, etc.

For Further Information

Call: The 1990 Conference Committee at 415-556-1866.

Note: Registration fees and hotel rates, etc., will be listed in the *Forum* as soon as they become available.

The Longing of the Lodgepole Pine



*for a million years
we flirted in the forest*

*thunder roared down the canyon
each time we kissed*

*i screamed at the touch
of your hot tongue*

*your heat released the seeds
from my tight cones*

*and scattered them
in your scorched wake*

*lover, where have you gone?
for the children's sake*

*if not for me
i pray you will return*

*it's been almost a century
i need to burn!*

from the book, Paint the Earth on Me, by Daniel Grego, Wild Space Farm, Ixonia, Wisconsin 53036. Reproduced here by kind permission of the author. [Ed's. Note: We wish the penultimate line were to read 3, 4, or even 5 centuries; but we think the expressed thought is perceptive.]




Figure 1. National Park System areas in the northeastern United States—a region where suppression of all fires remains the dominant fire management policy.

Prescribed Burning Opportunities in National Parks of the Northeastern United States

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From a presentation given at the
Fourth Triennial Conference on
Research in the National Parks
and Equivalent Reserves, Fort
Collins, CO, 1986. (Updated,
1989.)

The purpose of this paper is to review and describe the opportunities for implementing prescribed fire programs in national parks of the northeastern United States, a region where suppression of all fires remains the dominant fire management policy (Fig. 1).

Wildfires have been an important component of terrestrial ecosystems for at least the past half billion years (Komarek, 1973). Fire alters both the physical and chemical characteristics of soils in which plants must live and the structure and composition of vegetation. As vegetation changes, so does the habitat for a variety of animal species. The National Park Service (NPS) historically viewed fire as a destructive force, but in recent years has reevaluated its position in light of new ecological evidence that suggests that some of our most valued vegetation types and wildlife species depend upon the rejuvenating effects of wildfires (Leopold et al., 1963). Early policies that called for the complete suppression of all fires have been replaced, in some instances, by management plans that call for allowing some natural (i.e., lightning-caused) fires to burn within predetermined geographic and climatic constraints. These "unscheduled" (after Fischer, 1985) ignitions may be complemented by "scheduled" ignitions—fires that are set by resource managers to accomplish specific management objectives such as hazard fuel reduction, vegetation manipulation, or wildlife habitat maintenance. Prescribed natural fire programs, where unscheduled lightning ignitions are monitored but not necessarily suppressed,

have been implemented in several western parks including Yellowstone, Yosemite, and Sequoia-Kings Canyon. Prescribed fire with scheduled ignitions has been employed in the ponderosa pine-white fir forests of Crater Lake National Park to encourage the regeneration of pine and to reduce the accumulation of fuel that could lead to uncontrollable wildfires. Fires are ignited at Redwood National Park to retard the encroachment of Douglas-fir (*Pseudotsuga menziesii*) into redwood stands and at Everglades National Park and Big Cypress National Preserve to reduce the incidence of unscheduled human ignitions (i.e., malicious or accidental wildfires).

The parks of the Northeastern U.S. are, for a variety of cultural and ecological reasons, among the last to consider the use of prescribed fire as a management tool. Natural fires are rare in the region, and fires have historically occurred at long intervals and have been catastrophic in nature. This has led to a perception on the part of the public that all wildland fires are destructive. Little research has been conducted to examine the natural role of fire in ecosystems of the Northeast. Instead, ecologists speak of a "shifting mosaic steady state" (Bormann and Likens, 1979) in which classical concepts of succession and climax are more applicable than modern disturbance theory.

Resource managers in the Northeast have little experience fighting fires, and equipment is often outdated and of little use in prescribed fire situations. Thus, it is not surprising that managers have been reluctant to employ

controlled burns for management purposes.

Even in the larger western parks, however, where the natural role of fire is well understood, prescribed fire programs have been slow to develop. Rocky Mountain National Park, for example, was the first NPS unit to prepare and implement a fire management plan. The plan designated a natural fire zone where lightning-caused fires were allowed to burn. Problems with fire containment and public opposition to what was perceived to be a "let-burn" policy led to a temporary suspension of the plan, however (Axtell, 1986). Other parks, especially those in the Northeast, lack information necessary to reintroduce fire as a natural process. At parks with high visitor use and/or in densely populated areas, public safety will always be a concern.

The Present Situation

Prescribed Natural Fires

It is unlikely that natural fire programs ever will be implemented in the Northeast. Research conducted at Cape Cod National Seashore (Patterson et al., 1985) suggests that lightning fires were probably uncommon prior to European settlement. Fires were common in some areas (Patterson and Backman, 1988), but most were probably caused by Indians (Patterson and Sassaman, 1987). The NPS has generally been reluctant to use scheduled ignitions to duplicate the effects of Indian burning, but, in the Northeast a lack of burning during the twentieth century has led to dangerous accumulations of fuels. At

Acadia National Park on the Maine coast, fires have occurred at long intervals and have been catastrophic in nature (Patterson et al., 1983b). Although fuel accumulations in some areas of the Park are of concern, a reintroduction of natural fire is in our opinion both impractical and undesirable. Only five of 218 fires occurring at Acadia since 1937 have been caused by lightning, and none of these burned more than 0.1 hectare. Acadia is a relatively small park, with the largest unit only 12,000 hectares. Boundaries are complex, and this complicates the task of protecting adjacent properties. The cool, wet, coastal climate is rarely conducive to burning, but during droughts like the one that preceded the great Bar Harbor Fire of 1947, fire hazard in the Park's spruce forests can be extreme. A strong bias toward fire suppression on the part of the public and park managers argues against the implementation of a natural fire program. The same situation applies in other parks in the Northeast.

Prescribed Fire with Scheduled Ignitions

We do not advocate the implementation of a natural fire program in the Northeast, but it is recognized that there are some instances where prescribed fires with scheduled ignitions are appropriate. Prescribed fires are currently employed on a limited basis. They could be used to meet several objectives for a variety of purposes. A burning program was initiated in 1983, and most fires to date have been conducted for research and training purposes. Only at Saratoga National

Historical Park has a prescribed burning program been implemented for management purposes.

Saratoga National Historical Park

Saratoga National Historical Park in Stillwater, New York was established in 1948 to preserve and commemorate the site of the Battles of Saratoga, pivotal encounters between British and American troops in the early days of the Revolutionary War. The Battle took place in September and October, 1777 on land that had been partially cleared by settlers during the preceding two-to-three decades. Troops cleared additional land, and today nearly 300 of the Park's 1130 hectares are designated for maintenance as open areas. Elm-ash-maple, oak, and white pine forests comprise the natural vegetation of the area, which occupies bluffs and high land overlooking the western banks of the Hudson River north of Albany. In the absence of human intervention, fields are invaded by shrubs and trees, and park personnel have historically either mowed fields or leased them to farmers for cultivation. The decline in the local agricultural economy, the rising cost of mowing (estimated to be \$82.50 per hectare in 1986), and the hazards associated with operating heavy machinery on the steep slopes along the river prompted park officials to request assistance in evaluating the potential of prescribed fire as a means of maintaining open space within the Park.

An initial review of fire reports and historic accounts of the settling of the area indicated that natural and human ignitions have

been rare during the twentieth century, but that fire was probably used by European settlers, and before them, Indians, to clear land. We know little about presettlement Indian burning practices, but early explorers reported at least local use of fire by Indians in east-coast forests (Russell, 1983). Burning for land clearing was a common practice among settlers during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries [see Dickens (1867) for an interesting account of the destruction caused by these fires].

The Park, with the assistance of fire personnel at the regional office in Boston and students and scientists at the University of Massachusetts' Cooperative Park Studies Unit, conducted initial research burns during Spring 1985. Objectives included evaluation of the effectiveness of fire in retarding shrub and tree development in open fields and shrub lands, and the development and assessment of site-specific fuel models and burn prescriptions. In a joint study with wildlife biologists from New York's College of Environmental Sciences and Forestry at Syracuse, we evaluated interactions between treatments such as prescribed burning and mowing and browsing by deer, populations of which are reaching nuisance levels in and around the Park. Research burns continued during the Fall 1985 and Spring 1986. Early indications suggested that prescribed fire can be employed safely and effectively to maintain open fields. Burning is most effective when conducted before green-up in the spring (generally during April and early May). With favorable winds (8-25 kph), humidity between 20 and 40 percent, and clear

skies, fields can be burned within 24 hours after light to moderate rain. Thus the hazard of fires spreading into surrounding woodlands, which remain damp for several days, is reduced. Spring burns appear to be more effective than fall burns in killing shrubs and tree saplings, because some herbs remain green into late fall, and the presence of these live fuels reduces the intensity of fall burns.

The first few burns at Saratoga pointed out one of the problems associated with developing a prescribed burning program in a region where prescribed fire is not employed and where the incidence of wildfires is low. The Park is critically short of trained fire personnel. At any one time the Park can count on no more than a few trained personnel from among its own staff. The regional office has supplemented the Park crew with personnel from other parks in the region. Although this provides valuable fire experience to those who participate, the logistics of filling crews given the fickle nature of New England's weather and the fact that the best burning season occurs before most parks add seasonal rangers restrict the opportunities for burning.

The initial program at Saratoga was small, with 6-to-8 hectares burned during each of the two years prior to 1986. The Park has since developed a fire management plan that calls for an expansion of the program to 20-to-30 hectares burned per year. Research will continue to determine long-term impacts of burning on the structure and composition of park vegetation. Early results suggest that fields can be burned at three-to-

five year intervals, but additional monitoring will be required.

Fire Island National Seashore

The first prescribed fires in the North Atlantic Region were conducted at Fire Island National Seashore during June and July of 1983 and 1984. Small (0.05 ha) plots were established in a stand of huckleberry (*Gaylussacia bacata*) near Watch Hill on Fire Island. The objectives of the burn were to evaluate the fire suppression capability of Seashore personnel and equipment and to obtain information on fire behavior in huckleberry, which was reported to have flammable leaves. It was found that the only fire equipment available for fighting wildland fires was that kept at a local marina for extinguishing fires on pleasure craft. The high-volume, low-pressure portable pumps that were used were unsuitable for wildland fire suppression, and after the first burn it was recommended that the Seashore obtain high-pressure/low-volume equipment. It was also found that fires in huckleberry can produce flame lengths of 3-to-4 meters above canopies that are no more than a meter high within a few hours after light rain. Seashore personnel with experience fighting fires in southern California likened fire behavior in huckleberry to that in chaparral, and these initial research burns at Fire Island lead to the development of a major study to evaluate ways of reducing fire hazard where huckleberry is an important component of the vegetation.

Cape Cod National Seashore

Cape Cod National Seashore contains more than 3,387 hectares of mixed oak and/or pitch pine forests, most of which contain dense stands of huckleberry in the understory. Live fuel loadings of stems less than 1.5 meters in height average 9 to 13.5 tons per hectare with values as high as 31.5 tons per hectare in some stands (Patterson et al., 1983a). These dense shrub stands act as ladders up which flames climb to the canopy and thus contribute to the severe hazard of crown fires in stands that contain abundant pitch pine (*Pinus rigida*). Cape Cod National Seashore averaged more than 10 wildfires per year during the period 1974-1983. All were ignited by humans. Although most fires were small and none exceeded 12 hectares in size, fires of several hundred hectares have burned elsewhere on Cape Cod during the past 30 years. With more than 500 private tracts as inholdings and more than 6 million visitors per year at Cape Cod National Seashore, the threat of destructive wildfires is large. Recognizing the contribution of flammable shrub understories to the overall fire potential, Seashore personnel requested assistance in evaluating both fire behavior under varying fuel and weather conditions and the potential of various treatments for reducing fuel loading. In 1985 a study was initiated in which 48 0.04-hectare plots are treated by mowing or prescribed burns during either the dormant or the growing season and at intervals of from one-to-four years. The first 12 plots were burned during April and May 1986; with an additional 12 plots burned

during July. Preliminary results after four years of burning show that both dormant and growing season burns can be conducted without seriously damaging overstory pine and oak. Soil moisture conditions must be monitored carefully during summer months, however, so that burns can be scheduled at times when tree root systems will not be damaged. Mortality of huckleberry stems approaches 100 percent, even when burns are conducted during the summer within two days following rain. We have found that by the judicious application of back and strip-head fires we can control fire behavior and avoid overstory fire damage during the summer. Early work by Buell and Cantlon (1953) suggests that repeated dormant season burns reduce the proportion of huckleberry relative to blueberry (*Vaccinium* spp.) in New Jersey pine-oak forests. If treatments can decrease the present 3 to 1 proportion of huckleberry to blueberry in Cape Cod forests, the hazard of wildfires could be significantly reduced, because blueberry leaves are not flammable when green. This research, although in its early stages, should, over the next five years, provide NPS with valuable information on fire behavior and fuel-hazard reduction techniques.

Future Prospects

An expansion of prescribed burning programs in northeastern national parks, beyond those described above, seems unlikely in the near future. Prescribed fire with scheduled ignitions might be employed at Acadia National Park to reduce fuel hazard and increase the proportion of less

flammable deciduous trees. Park personnel are reluctant to consider burning given the lack of information on fire behavior in mature and over-mature spruce forests, however. Additional trained personnel would be required before the Park would consider even small research burns. Burning might be employed more widely at Cape Cod, but state regulations restrict open burning to the period January 15 to May 1 and during the hours of 10:00am and 4:00pm. Thus management burns would have to be small and located in areas where smoke would not impact the public. At least in the near future, there is little likelihood that burning will be employed on more than a few hectares annually. At both Acadia and Cape Cod it is unlikely that prescribed burning will be employed on large acreages. A large, catastrophic wildfire at either unit could increase interest in the use of prescribed fire for fuel-hazard reduction, however. In the absence of such a catastrophe, fire can be expected to be employed primarily for maintaining open fields at Saratoga and, perhaps, vistas at some of the smaller parks.

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Potpourri

Some Notes from the 1988 Tucson Conference

The following note from Lenard Brown, Regional Historian, Southeast Region, contains an idea worthy of further exploration:

".....Prior to traveling to Tucson for the November meeting, four of the representatives from the Southeast Region agreed to take notes on the sessions attended. The plan was to assemble the notes with some minimal editing and distribute the information to the parks in the Southeast Region who have significant numbers of cultural resources. At the suggestion of John Peine of Great Smoky Mountains—copy of memo enclosed—I am sending you a copy of our efforts.

"I do not necessarily agree with John's suggestion that this process be formalized for the sixth conference for two reasons. First, of the three dozen copies distributed in February, John has been the only one to comment or acknowledge receipt. Everyone suffers from some degree of information overload. Second, formalizing the process may eliminate the values that Peine

.....continued on page 25

Introduction to The Role and Effect of Fire in Greater Yellowstone

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Presented at *Examining the
Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem: A
Symposium on Land and
Resource Management*,
University of Wyoming, Laramie,
Wyoming, April 13, 1989

It's been a once in a career type of experience, to be able to watch the saga of Yellowstone's fires unfold. In the regional office I have been removed just enough from Yellowstone policy and decision-making to be able to watch and wait with relative impunity from personal attack. When the press calls I can always say "you'll have to check with John Varley for the details but this is pretty much the way we see it from here...." So I have enjoyed being some distance from the inflammatory barbs levied by Park Service critics yet been close enough to the action to benefit from the mind stretching stimulated by, perhaps, the biggest controversy in Park Service history so far.

Perhaps not by coincidence, the previous top seed in NPS resource management controversies also originated in Yellowstone. That controversy resulted in the 1963 Leopold Report¹ which has served as the thesis for Park Service resource management for the last quarter century. Some say the Leopold Report is outdated....being based on pre-1950 conventional thought. I would argue that point and contend that a scholarly review of *all* assessments of the resource management policies of the National Park Service conducted in the last 30 years or so—and there have been many, three separate ones were ongoing in 1988—have resulted in essentially the same recommendations. In fact, the recently released NPCA "Gordon Report"² said:

The concept of "naturalness" is not a simple and comprehensive guide for management. It will not anywhere substitute for identification of well-

defined, park-specific, and research-based objectives.

I do not believe that the most often cited "faults" in National Park Service resource management can be rightly attributed to the Leopold recommendations, or to lack of information, or even to inadequate staff and funds. And I will explain.

A 1972 paper by Don Despain on "Fire as an Ecological Force in Yellowstone Ecosystems"³ stated the following:

....it should be pointed out that nature is amoral. Changes or events in a natural area are neither good nor bad, beneficial nor detrimental. Only in man-oriented value systems may these values be applied. Whether a particular event is beneficial or detrimental is dependent on the goals we set for ourselves. We must remember that our goals for a natural area of a national park are "....to conserve, perpetuate, and portray as a composite whole the indigenous aquatic and terrestrial fauna and flora and the scenic landscape." Natural fire is not destructive nor devastating, but quite necessary for the achievement of these goals.

I believe the key point here is the requirement for established goals to serve as a benchmark for determining benefit or detriment.

The Leopold advisory board quoted from a report produced by a committee representing eight nations at the First World Conference on National Parks in 1962. The board strongly concurred with the following statement:

Management is defined as an activity directed toward achieving or main-

taining a given condition in plant and/or animal populations and/or habitats in accordance with the conservation plan for the area. A prior definition of the purposes and objectives of each park is assumed. Management may involve manipulation of the plant and animal communities, or protection from modification or external influences.

Again, the reference is made to purposes and objectives. I firmly believe that it is in this realm that the greatest consternation over national park management has been nurtured.

That early '60s controversy that spawned the Leopold Report was, of course, control of Yellowstone's ungulate populations. I would venture a guess that any of the state game and fish agencies operating in the Yellowstone area would love to have the "problem" of managing, without interference, a herd of 30,000 elk. I also believe that each has the expertise to manage that herd to a given objective be it maximum sustained yield, optimum sex and age class distributions, or even maximum economic yields for recreation. No, these are not the egocentric claims of a frustrated wildlifer turned bureaucrat because I believe those same agencies would find it absolutely impossible to manage that herd through natural processes aloneeven without goals or objectives.

The "maximum sustained yield" goal is one based in fact! That is, measurable parameters. The natural population goal is one based largely in fancy. Sure, a natural population goal could certainly be iterated by a scientist, or group of scientists. But with the continuing controversy over herbivore/range

relationships among scientists, that iteration would necessarily represent a compromise of many viewpoints. Chances are that it might not resemble reality any more than most committee-designed products.

Well, before someone tells me I'm at the wrong symposium I'll return to the subject at hand: fire in the ecosystem. But just as in the ungulate scenario, without an established, understandable, and generally accepted goal we cannot assess the benefit or detriment of the fires of 1988. We can only apply the scientific method to look at measureable effects on ecosystem components and functions.

We will hear many discussions this week of the effects of the fires of 1988 on the various components and processes in the Yellowstone ecosystem. I would challenge you to consider, following each discussion, whether these impacts are good or bad in your own personal perspective. If we remember to do this only a few times I believe we will soon be faithful supporters of Don Despain's claim that nature is amoral and that good and bad reside only in the minds of man. And the benefits or detriments of the fires of '88 can only be measured against a set of objectives, or goals, established for the Yellowstone ecosystem.

It is those goals which, I believe, will and should be re-examined and reshaped for the next century. *But*, if we now accept the "natural process" goal established for Yellowstone over the last couple of decades and we listen to Bill Romme's⁴ fire history of the area, I believe we can have no other opinion except

to vindicate the National Park Service for remaining true to its objective. The Service successfully cooperated with nature as it pulled off a 200-year ecological event in our lifetime in the face of criticism whose incendiary character often exceeded that of the fires themselves. Sure, the *Wall Street Journal* called it mindless bungling....but as writer Thomas McGuane put it: *Anything that makes the world look better to animals and worse to humans is probably good.*

So my only regrets for the Yellowstone fires of '88 are limited to the impacts on last summer's visitors and the property of our park neighbors and the potential for crisis-driven policy changes. Even the cost is defensible. A hundred million or so dollars for a two or three hundred year event equates to a few hundred thousand dollars a year. Yellowstone Park spends more than that for toilet paper and much more than that to dispose of it. And most of us "parkies" still feel the resource should have a slight priority over visitation.

So even America's most trusted federal agency is not perfect. And the argument against "natural process" management is growing! I think history will show this philosophy to be one which dominated the second half of the twentieth century as a reaction to the heavy-handed manipulation policies of the first half of the century. It is an aspiration to what once was but can never be again. It is an attempt to assert man over nature while admonishing that very process. For the mere thought that a "natural ecosystem," that is, one without the *influence* of man, can be maintained by the *protection* of

man is an anthropomorphic and internally conflicting concept.

Again, the "Gordon Report" clarified Leopold et al. by saying:

Ecosystem Management, then, should focus on site-specific efforts to retain key resources directly serving park goals; creative solutions may not fit conventional wisdom about nature or its manipulation.

A recent writer characterized Yellowstone as an aquarium...a self-contained ecosystem with all necessary components intact. This concept brings to mind an image of impermeable, but transparent walls through which interested visitors may view with awe the natural components engaged in their natural processes. An interesting metaphor, perhaps, but not exactly true to life. To my way of thinking, not even close!

Yellowstone Park is often touted as one of America's premier "natural laboratories." But is it, in fact? Each year millions of human visitors drive thousands of miles over the Park's hundreds of miles of paved roads spewing countless tons of toxic substances into its air and waters. For months on end the park is filled with the sound and scents of free-roving park visitors and Park Service managers. Field researchers and back-country visitors may feel isolated from the conundrum by a mile or two separation from pavement. But I doubt a summer day passes in which a single elk, moose, or grizzly bear is not at sometime distracted by the scent of John Q. Visitor, his vittles, or his vehicles.

And all too often, Yellowstone's resource management decisions are being made in the courts. For although it does not fit the

aquarium metaphor, it is certainly the goldfish bowl of the Park Service with regard to perpetual public scrutiny. More so than any other national park, Yellowstone's management is influenced by the American public.

And for some unexplained, and obviously non-scientific reason, the Park Service switches thinking caps at the land-water interface. Each day hundreds of miles of rivers are fished by thousands of anglers choreographed by a complex set of near-"riffle-specific" regulations. Sure, we manage the aquatic ecosystems, but we do it by managing its components to very tight and closely scrutinized parameters. In this highly successful process we have elevated, or maintained, Yellowstone as America's premier "fishing hole." By intensively managing its fishery, we have maximized Yellowstone's potential to the fisherman.

Our terrestrial mammal policy is, obviously, incongruent. We have attempted to allow huge herbivore populations to "self-regulate," that is, to allow the typical irruption-crash cycles deemed natural by 1940s range management thinking, and as scientific thinking evolved—in some locations—we continued with the same strategies all the while disavowing that the boom/bust cycles must really happen. This kind of thinking has generally led to political solutions to biological problems at historic intervals.

So why has our aquatic management program met with such success while our terrestrial management program has caused such stress among local and national constituencies? The answer again is *goals*! In the case of

the fisheries, politics established the goals. Fishing was to be allowed, encouraged, and managed for high yields of fish and fun. Capable scientists then gathered the information they needed and began to develop the prescriptions to meet those objectives. Application of those prescriptions was closely followed by intensive monitoring of fish, habitat, and fishermen in an effort to hone the program to the very cutting edge for maximizing sustained recreational yield. The program met its goals and was, therefore, deemed successful.

Let's compare quickly our goals for terrestrial population management. Perhaps songstress Doris Day had them in mind in the late '50s when she recorded:

Que sera, sera

What ever will be, will be.

The Future's not ours to see,

Que sera, sera.

I believe our national parks deserve more clearly iterated management objectives. The hunting programs—yes, perhaps even the grazing programs that some national parks have been created with—may be blessings in disguise. For they have provided the scientists and managers with a set of goals or objectives to manage for. And they have provided for the application of effective methods to achieve those objectives.

As you listen to the talks at this symposium, many of you will change or strengthen your own opinions as to whether the Park Service should actively manage ecosystems for obtainable conditions or should be content to guard our boundaries and minimize outside influences. Do not forget that

since many feel "parks are for people," we must always recognize the *inside* influences of our own visitors, entrepreneurial concessionaires, and the constant pressure for park "improvement" projects.

There's a lot of room between the extremities on this issue but I don't think many scientists will support a fence-straddling position as intellectually tenable. As Texas Commissioner of Agriculture, Jim Hightower, was quoted in *Time* magazine last week:

There's nothing in the middle of the road but yellow lines and dead armadillos!

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The Story Itself: Lessons and Hopes from the Yellowstone Fire Media Event

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Based on a talk given to the
Montana Project Wild Workshop,
Yellowstone Park, April 1, 1989

A few years ago I was living in Livingston, Montana, working as a writer, and I accepted a few assignments from *Newsweek*. The last of those assignments was to cover the famous "Mountain Man Kidnapping" at Big Sky. I put some time in making phone calls, chased around talking to officers, and, as the newsweekly people say, "filed some graphs" on the story. After an editor in New York had digested the material I sent him, he wrote up the story, then called me to read it back to me.

As he read, I occasionally recognized information I hadn't given him. At one point I interrupted him and said, "Now you didn't get that from me: I didn't know that." And he responded—get this—"Let'em sue us."

Now I think most of us have at one time or another discovered—usually when the subject was something we knew a little about—that the news media make a lot of mistakes. That's hardly news—in fact, I doubt it will *ever* make the news—and there isn't much sport in media-bashing. Even if there were, I'm not sure I'm in a good position to do it. I'm author, co-author, or editor of sixteen books and more than 100 articles; by almost anyone's definition, I must be part of the problem.

But it's a real problem, and the fires of 1988 reminded me, as few other things have, of just how big a problem it is. I spent the summer of 1988 trying to learn about the fires by watching the network news in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. I knew, from my few contacts with friends in the park, that things weren't coming out straight in the news, but I had no idea how crooked they *were* coming out.

Then in early September I accepted my present position with the National Park Service as a Technical Writer. On September 13 I arrived at park headquarters and hurried directly to my new boss—and old friend—John Varley's office. We climbed into his car and drove south—toward Norris Geyser Basin.

Almost immediately, we were traveling through areas that, according to the computer graphics on the nightly news, were blasted like ground zero, and I realized that I'd been had. As I gaped around, I mumbled something about not expecting to see so much green. John told me that that was the almost universal reaction of people the first time they saw what actually happened during the fires. The media fouled up this story in a big way. Yellowstone's fires were obviously huge, but their effects and meanings were nowhere near as clear as the media suggested.

A Reprieve for the Real Story

Normally, that kind of problem would be without solution, and without result besides a sadly misinformed public. But this time we got lucky. Dr. Conrad Smith of the Ohio State University School of Journalism recognized in the fires an extraordinary research opportunity, and whether or not the public ever figures out what really happened in Yellowstone, those of us more closely involved will at least have the satisfaction of knowing what went wrong in much greater detail than we ever imagined we would.

Dr. Smith is a specialist in the analysis of environmental reporting, and he tells us that the

Yellowstone fires got more attention from the mainstream national media than any other natural resource issue in recent history—more than Three Mile Island, Bhopal, or the snail darter. Yellowstone is magic, and its "destruction" really flipped a switch in the news organizations.

Dr. Smith is working on an extended project, through which he and his colleagues will review, computerize, and quantitatively evaluate more than a million words of local, regional, and national newspaper coverage as well as all television coverage on the evening news of the three major networks. This will eventually result in any number of papers and a book, but has already resulted in some wonderfully provocative observations.

He started by explaining that "the media abhors complexity," pointing out that most reporters are generalists. He wrote, in his preliminary research proposal, that, "Journalists who do not have the specialized expertise to thoroughly understand technical and scientific aspects of a story tend to avoid writing about them in a substantive way. Published content analyses of how the press covered environmental stories such as at Three Mile Island, the Snail Darter controversy, and the chemical leak at Bhopal suggest journalists in these circumstances tend to focus on discrete events while trivializing or sensationalizing related issues."

There is more here than lack of expertise or simple incompetence. In my own experience, it seems to me that reporters are generally very smart people, and many working on the Yellowstone fires showed extraordinary energy. The

problem is more subtle than that. As Dr. Smith explained, there are many biases built in to the uninformed mind. Most reporters have experience with one kind of fire: urban house fire. Such fires are always bad, and are always suppressed as fast as possible. Given that cultural baggage, there was bound to be a lot of confusion when the reporters got to Yellowstone and discovered that we had actually let fires go. As Dr. Smith put it, "If my house caught fire, and a week later it was still burning, I'd be upset too."

But Dr. Smith said that it wasn't really the anti-fire bias that eventually caused the press to "screw up" (his term) so often. In his preliminary analysis of 112 news stories, he discovered that the average error rate was only about twice the normal rate, which, sad though it was, was within the range of acceptability in today's media (two of the worst jobs of reporting, he determined, were done by Jim Coates of the *Chicago Tribune* and Tim Egan of *The New York Times*). But that didn't bother him as much as his persistent feeling that they missed the real story.

Reporters arrived here already determined, by their past experiences and the limitations of their training, that this was a disaster story, or in the more formal language of journalism, a "disorder story." Dr. Smith explained that according to one system of story classification, there are four categories of disorder: natural, technological, social, and moral:

"The Yellowstone fires were treated by journalists as both a natural and social disorder story. Some reporters also treated them as a technological

disorder story, because the fires could not be suppressed; and as a moral disorder story, because the park's wildfire policy did not require immediate suppression of all fires."

I'm sure you can see the many consequences and complications of approaching the Yellowstone fires this way. So much was going on here, in science, in forestry, in philosophical debates, that just didn't fit the mold. Many reporters apparently showed up knowing that this was not news unless something went wrong. There had to be someone to blame, and there had to be something to blame them for.

Understand that the problem here is beside the question of whether or not the agencies did a good job with the fires. The formal review process that followed the fires revealed any number of administrative mistakes, problems, and complications that occurred during the fighting of the fires. Reporters are supposed to be skeptical and look for error. But they are supposed to do it in an objective and informed manner. What Dr. Smith was proposing, and what many of us witnessed, was that many in the media started with a presumption, arrived at subconsciously or intuitively before even getting here, that their assignment was to report what went wrong rather than what happened. However much may in fact have gone wrong, that presumption was not a neutral or professionally defensible place to start.

The effect of this poor start was most obvious on the evening news. Television reporters at a disaster have among their leading goals a need to interview victims.

When reporters looked around here for victims, the only handy ones were local merchants, who, according to Dr. Smith, were vastly overrepresented in the television coverage, and presented as authoritative, knowledgeable sources of information with no effort to check their actual qualifications or expertise. Being handy was the only requirement.

My own saddest recollection of this phenomenon was of watching the coverage of the Cooke City crisis. The fire was the Storm Creek Fire, originating on the Custer National Forest miles north of Yellowstone Park. This fire was initially managed as a natural fire under the terms of Custer National Forest's natural fire plan, but as it grew larger it was aggressively fought. In fact, the town was actually threatened by a man-caused backburn set to deflect the main fire. But for television, it was much simpler, and so we were treated to views of the torching trees right on the edge of town, interspersed with interviews with local businesspeople who complained bitterly about the Park Service fire policy. Very few viewers would have assumed anything except that the fire was the result of park policy.

What worsened the situation for both managers and the public was that the whole fire season became an event driven as much by the media as by the heat and wind (though heat and wind isn't all that bad a term to apply to the media, I guess).

For example, park plant ecologist Don Despain was in the field one day preparing a study plot in the path of a fire. He was accompanied by a reporter from the *Denver Post*, and they were dis-

cussing the scientific excitement of being able to study this little plot both before and after the burn. In that discussion, Don said, enthusiastically, "*burn baby burn*." In no time, his remark about his study plot was the source of public indignation, and he was represented as celebrating the so-called "destruction" of the entire park. As Dr. Smith noted, "When Wyoming Senator Malcom Wallop during his reelection campaign called for resignations of Department of Interior and National Park Service officials, he referred to an August 28 *Denver Post* story as justification." The news exercised extreme political power in those smoky days.

Incidentally, when Dr. Smith visited the park this winter, he went through the same "media shock treatment" I did. After driving through some of the park, and looking at the burn maps, he said he had to lower his expectations of the extent of the burns by an order of magnitude. He later wrote me that the experience of studying the media reaction to the Yellowstone fires had a big effect on him professionally:

Studying media coverage of the fires has changed how I teach. Based on what I found, a colleague has started paying less attention to students' spelling and grammar, putting more emphasis on the story itself. I hope the research, when published, will bring changes in how journalism is taught and practiced. But I'm not counting on it.

I'm not either. As the spring and summer of 1989 have progressed, there has been a second media event, as the press has reported on the "rebirth" of the

park. This has been, in most cases, an upbeat story about natural regeneration, a "good news" item that has had a higher level of accuracy, I think, but that is in its own way as troubling as the coverage of the fires themselves. We now see reporters speaking of the reports of Yellowstone's death as having been "greatly exaggerated," as if someone other than these very reporters were the ones who did the exaggeration. Looking back on the past year or so of fire news, it seems there must have been a smarter way to handle the story than this process of over-reaction followed by correction.

How Did the Agencies Do?

There are of course at least two sides to any mistake, and as Dr. Smith has pointed out, it's just as important to analyze the information sources as it is the information publishers. The National Park Service, the U.S. Forest Service, and the other agencies that eventually became involved in the fires, have been fairly open about admitting that they weren't up to the job of handling the flood of media attention. During the peak weeks of the fires, the Public Affairs Office in the park was operating seven days a week, eighteen hours a day, and assisting 200 media representatives a day either by phone or in person. Several key park administrators became full-time media contacts, as did numerous other staff members, including rangers and researchers. As one Park Service report has stated, "The NPS was organizationally unprepared at the park, Region, and Washington level to handle the media and information requests generated by

this and the other fires. Part of the problem was that there are very few qualified Incident Information Officers in the NPS."

The story of the information program parallels the fire suppression story. As the season went on, more and more people were recruited from around the country in a massive effort to get a very complicated job done. Often the job got done pretty well, often neither the agencies nor the media were satisfied with how the job got done. The park could not maintain adequate staff for this once-in-a-century media event any more than it could always keep enough fire fighters on hand to handle the exceptional 1988 fires.

But beyond the logistical problems of dispensing information, there were other times when we were confusing rather than clarifying the story.

For example, many agency spokespersons told the public most of the summer that "unnatural fuel levels," resulting from a century of fire suppression in the park, made the fires much worse than they would have been naturally. This message even appeared in the informational video that was updated all summer and shown at area visitor centers. I don't think we'll ever erase that image from the public mind, even though the serious fire ecologists know it isn't really true. In most of the park, with a fire interval of 250 to 400 years, fire suppression has only been consistently effective since World War II, when aerial fire fighting technology became available, and may have made no appreciable difference at all in fuel loads.

Another unfortunate backfire (so to speak) in the information

program involved the daily map of fire perimeters produced on desk-top computers by Yellowstone staff. The map, on an 8.5 x 11 sheet revised daily, showed huge black blotches spreading across the landscape, and though the text prominently said that as much as half of the area within the perimeters of the fires was not burned, the visual effect of solid blackness was the durable one in most people's minds. These maps were probably the source of those stunning computer graphics on network news, where vast portions of the park suddenly burst into vivid orange flames while America watched in horror. These little maps did not visually portray the complex nature of the burn "mosaic," and so burn perimeters were immediately confused with total burn acreages. Predictably, the press used the largest numbers available.

Another complication resulted from the Park Service's efforts to explain the ecological effects of the fires (and of park policy). Early in the fire season, when the fires were "behaving" and acting like everyone's notion of "good" fires, the park's interpreters and administrators told what later became known as the happy-face story. They explained, as they had during the 16 previous years of the natural fire plan's existence, that fire has a well documented role in wilderness settings, and Yellowstone and other national parks and federal lands embarked years before on a program to reestablish that role. The ecological truths were self-evident. Fire is our friend.

But then the fires got less and less friendly, and to many people the park's message of fire as an

appropriate wilderness inhabitant began to sound hollow. Worse, as commercial interests near the park began to suffer, or perceive a risk to their well-being, many people saw the happy-face story as an insult, proof of the Park Service's insensitivity to the needs and economic welfare of the surrounding communities. The least attentive seemed to assume that the Park Service was not only happy about the ecological effects of the fires, but was also happy about the harm being done to local economies. Eventually, Yellowstone officials and interpreters were told, by Washington, to tone down the happy-face story, but most park personnel continued to celebrate the ecological wonder of the fires whenever possible.

There are a couple of ironies here. One is that because of the huge amount of money spent on the fire fighting effort, the fires seem to have boosted many (but by no means all) local business incomes above the average summer's. The other is that now, after the fires are out and the region's mood is calmer, the surrounding states and businesses, as well as many media people, have adopted the Park Service's once-hated happy-face story almost to the letter. Chambers of Commerce are speaking in glowing terms of the "great re-birth" of Yellowstone, and celebrating the wonder of ecological process at every opportunity, in the hope of luring visitors back to see the "new Yellowstone."

They are right to do so, of course, but they might not have to do it so aggressively if they hadn't been so loud and bitter (and visible, on the nightly news) last summer in proclaiming that Yellowstone was being destroyed.

Whether or not the Park Service, Forest Service, and the many commercial interests can change America's mind—that is, can convince the public that Yellowstone wasn't destroyed after all—is an important question that won't be answered for a few years. As of early August, 1989, Yellowstone Park visitation is quite high, certainly above average, leading to a whole new round of opinions over the fires: they increased visitation; they will temporarily increase visitation but in the long run visitation will decline; they had no effect on visitation. In any event, the fires will no doubt be mentioned as a factor for many years any time visitation trends appear worrisome. There is great comfort in being able to place blame.

But so far I've been talking mostly about agency communications on the big scale—dealing with the media, facing the political realities of a policy that was suddenly very unpopular, and that sort of thing. As my work got underway, and I spent more time talking to the people who had been thinking hard about these fires all summer, I learned that there were far more complicated pitfalls facing both the managers and the public.

The one that has engaged my attention most has been the rhetorical one. What does it mean to say that Yellowstone was "reborn" in the spring of 1989? There isn't an ecologist in the neighborhood who believes the place ever died; it just moved, dramatically and rapidly, along to a new stage in its complex of ecological processes. Why do our friends keep trying to reassure people by saying things like, "It's

not as bad as it looks," when in an ecological sense it's not bad, or good, or ugly, or anything but a natural process doing what natural processes do? Why do we keep telling people that the fires will "improve" habitat for the famous big animals when we're not in the husbandry business here? We're not out to raise the greatest number of creatures; we're out to protect the processes by which nature determines how many of each creature is enough. How can we get the news people to be more careful in using terms like "catastrophe" and "devastation" to describe the very processes that gave us this landscape in the first place? In short, how do we help unload a very loaded language?

Where Does All This Leave Us?

At this point in preparing this presentation, it looked to me as if my only possible conclusion for you educators—that is, the only message you can take back to your colleagues and your students—is "Trust No One." But upon reflection I realized that there are some reasons for hope and some things to learn.

Of course the fires taught us how much Americans really do care about this place, even if their understanding of it is limited and their perceptions of the fires were sadly damaged. But that's just good news, not instruction. There is a more general lesson, one that applies to school children no more than it applies to reporters.

Schools and park interpreters can never hope to prepare children for the specifics of every news story. It is not a failing of the American education system that very few people knew enough

about fire ecology and fire policy to intelligently evaluate the news. It is, however, a failing of the American education system that neither the reporters nor the public were sufficiently prepared, or educated, to react intelligently to the *idea* of the fires. Learning to think clearly and carefully—learning how to see the red flags in bad reporting, or in bureaucratic double-talk, for example—is the best we can hope for.

And we must be prepared to work with, not against, the established conventions of modern media. A friend of mine who worked at the information center at the Unified Area Command in West Yellowstone told me that the most hostile people, the ones most outraged by the fires or by fire policy, were often completely unresponsive to the staff. Uniformed NPS, USFS, or BLM personnel could make no headway at calm discussion. But those same angry people would sit in front of a television monitor and watch a professionally prepared video that said the same things the staff said, and would go away much calmed, even converted. Just as they believed Dan Rather when he said Yellowstone was being destroyed, they believed this anonymous commentator when he said it was not. The medium was everything. It's a lesson we must not forget.

But it's often not an easy lesson to follow. Yellowstone Superintendent Bob Barbee recently explained to me the frustration of trying to deal in television's notorious "ten second sound bites," knowing that only the most clever, or the most powerful, or the most controversial film clips would be used from the hours of taping that

might be done, and that if you wanted to be sure that *your* voice was heard, you had to worry more about saying something colorful than about saying something meaningful. Yellowstone's management issues are invariably complex, and yet television demands simplicity and brevity at the same times that it demands excitement.

On November 6, 1988, *The New York Times Magazine* ran a beautiful photo feature on the fires. One of the largest pictures showed the Arrow burn, near Obsidian Creek. Here, a burn of 10 years ago was reburned, leaving very little fuel in sight, hardly a typical Yellowstone fire scene. Another large picture—a full page—showed a portion of the "blowdown" along the road between Norris and Canyon, where a windstorm a few years ago knocked over hundreds of trees. The trees, with their stark upended roots, were burned in 1988. Neither caption explained that these were not typical fire scenes; readers could only assume that this was the sort of "devastation" that was common in Yellowstone. Those images will no doubt haunt many readers for a long time.

The challenge facing people who care about the parks—including administrators, researchers, writers, educators, and the media—is not to replace those images with bright green ones, but to inspire readers to a fuller appreciation of what the images really mean.

Suggested Readings On the Media, Rhetoric, and the Yellowstone Fires

Barbee, R., and P. Schullery. *Yellowstone:*

the smoke clears. National Parks 63(2-3):18-19.

Reid, T. R. When the press yelled 'fire!' Washington Post, July 30, 1989. D5.

Smith, C. Reporters, news sources, accuracy, and the Yellowstone forest fires. Paper accepted for presentation to the International Communications Association, San Francisco, May 1989.

Smith, C. Flames, firefighters and moonscapes: network television pictures

of the Yellowstone forest fires. Paper accepted for presentation at the Third Annual Visual Communications Conference, Park City, Utah, June 26, 1989.

Smith, C. Brave Firefighters, Endangered National Icons and Bumbling Land Managers: Network TV Myths about the 1988 Yellowstone Wildfires. Paper presented to the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Washington, D.C., August 13, 1989.

Potpourri

.....continued from page 11

identifies in his first paragraph. My suggestion would be that multiple attendees from regional offices or large parks consider undertaking a compilation of the notes on the conference, with the provision that they not expect very much response....."

John Peine's note: "I wish to commend you [Lenard Brown], Dan Brown, Tom Desjean, and Terry Winschel for the fine job done compiling notes from the subject conference. I found this form of recording of conference proceedings refreshing, in part due to the candid and informal style. A stronger sense of tone and emphasis emerges this way.

"I know this kind of thing can be a thankless job, but it is very useful. I would urge you, if you have not already done so, to forward a copy of your subject notes to the GWS Board of Directors and suggest this be done more formally at the sixth conference."

The combined "Notes on Fifth Triennial Conference of George Wright Society—Tucson, Arizona—November 1988" that accompanied Len Brown's note contains an Introduction which describes the 42+ page volume:

"In November 1988 the Southeast Regional Office sent a number of employees to the Fifth Triennial Conference of the George Wright Society. The theme of the conference was: Parks and Neighbors—Maintaining Diversity Across Political Boundaries. Four of these employees had backgrounds in cultural resource management. They agreed to take notes during the various sessions attended, compile them in an informal manner, and distribute them to the historical (cultural) parks within Southeast Region.

"What follows is the product of their work. In order that the material could reach the field areas as quickly as possible there was no attempt to edit the notes or synthesize them into a single narrative. Where several of the participants attended the same session there will be several sets of notes with some repetition. However, this is balanced by the fact that the several reporters emphasized different portions of the same talk. Supplementing the typed notes are several articles from the Arizona Daily Star and a few handouts from specific sessions.

"The material is organized in same order as the sessions took place and the copy of the program serves as the Table of Contents. Hopefully those who receive this material will find it as interesting as those who attended the week long meeting."

Potpourri.....continued on page 38

The National Parks: Political Versus Professional Determinants of Policy

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An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1986 superintendency course held at Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area, and a longer version of it can be found in the Public Administration Review, May-June, 1989.

There are many diverse opinions and views regarding the proper direction for our national park policy. As a scholar, former seasonal, and one who is concerned with both the protection of the national parks, and the National Park Service, I offer a perspective drawn from the fields of public policy, public administration and political science. It is my hope that this article furthers the policy debate so admirably begun in *Forum*.

Understanding Park Policy: Setting the Framework

Almost all debate about the purpose of and the policy for national parks begins with the 1916 Act which created the U.S. National Park Service (NPS), and especially the section which established the so-called "use and preservation" mandate. This section of the Organic Act has had different meanings to different people at different times. It has also had different meanings to the NPS, both historically and within the agency at any given period. Yet, it remains the touchstone for everyone concerned with the purpose of the national parks. In an important sense this section performs the same function as the U.S. Constitution has for the larger political system; it has remained flexible enough to adjust to changing conditions and demands. In the 1920s, the agency's first Directors, Stephen Mather and Horace Albright, used the 1916 Act to promote visitation in the parks to establish a constituency for them and to make it more difficult for the Forest Service to assert control over the parks.¹

Today, this same section is used to limit visitation in the name of preserving "unimpaired" park resources. Yet curiously, no one has really tried to examine what those involved in drafting this section meant by such terms as "enjoyment" and "unimpaired" in the context of 1916.² Perhaps the discovery of such intentions is impossible today, but such information might help to provide some guidance on possible interpretation of this important section.

What is perhaps more important, from a policy perspective, is the determination of who has the most influence over how the 1916 Act's mandate is interpreted and implemented. One of the most useful models for studying these questions of policy has been provided by Francis Rourke.³ Rourke's perspective centers on agency power. In the case of park policy, he thus describes what conditions create power for the National Park Service. Rourke asserts that bureaucratic or agency power has two components, politics and expertise. Agencies can use either, or ideally both, to increase agency power. Upper level managers are likely to rely on the politics component, while technical specialists favor expertise.⁴ Enlarging his framework, these two measures can be said to apply to the entire decision environment surrounding national park policy and not just the NPS. Park policy decisions can be made by experts (the Park Service), by the political system (other actors), or by both. Drawing on the 1916 Organic Act mandate, decisions made within the park policy area can be said to be oriented more towards "use" or towards "preser-

vation." Thus a two-dimensional continuum can be used to locate actors in the park policy arena, as shown in Figure 1.

Making Park Policy

Experts and Preservation

Beginning in Cell I are actors who favor park preservation over park use and who are Park Service professionals (hence experts). These actors believe that their expertise should guide park policy decisions towards park preservation. One group of experts in this area consists of park scientists. They are generally specialists who perform research in national parks in areas of their professional expertise. Their professional orientations can lead them to startling views of the national parks, as illustrated by the following scenario outlined in *Forum*:

What happens.....when park science is viewed as an end in itself rather than as a tool of park management? When significant numbers of scientific and lay people (presumably environmentalists) view certain parks primarily as scientific benchmarks, gene pools, and relict environments of inestimable value to mankind in a trembling biosphere?

An extreme scenario might go like this: First, certain parks or segments thereof are designated ecological reserves. Second, scientific study, not enjoyment and use, becomes the controlling purpose in such reserves. Third, traditional park management is relieved in favor of a science management board.⁵

Visitor use of parks becomes secondary, subordinate to the needs of science, based on this scenario.

A somewhat less radical description of park scientists' positions is the belief that research should guide decisions regarding visitor use. A good example is the "limits of acceptable change" (LOC) concept.⁶ Under this tool, visitor use of park resources could be managed and controlled to mini-

ists. They differ somewhat from park scientists in that they are supposed to be on-the-ground managers of park resources (rather than park rangers, park interpreters, park maintenance employees, etc.). They often have advanced degrees in a natural resource-related subject.




Figure 1. National Park Policy Continuums

mize change in park resources and the park experience valued by visitors. In theory, parks are preserved "for the benefit of future generations," according to the 1916 Act. The danger, as Douglas Wellman has noted, is that park visitors may be perceived as "threats" to be managed to protect resources, rather than as integral to the NPS mission.⁷

Another group within the Park Service that also favors expertise-centered preservation management are resource management special-

In 1986, a fascinating example of intra-agency conflict arose between park resource specialists and traditional management at Yellowstone National Park. The Yellowstone Park Preservation Council, consisting primarily of park employees, was formed to counter what it says was the "pro-development" (pro-use) bias of park management. Members of the Council felt that they could "make an important contribution to the park's planning process because of their diverse scientific

and professional backgrounds."⁸ Park management, the Council charged, was too oriented to the demands of local congressional delegations. Thus, the Yellowstone Park Preservation Council appears to fit into the expert-preservation cell created by the two continuums.

Policy Generalists, Preservation, and Use

Controversies over Yellowstone relate to Cell II in Figure 1. Most of the key decisions regarding individual parks are made by park superintendents, with some supervision by regional and national management. Park managers (and upper level managers, as well) are policy generalists. A generalist, according to Rourke, "is likely to be far more sensitive than professionals to the need for compromise in pursuing objectives—the necessity of settling for half a loaf, or of taking the view of other groups and organizations into account in reaching decisions," thus moving the managers down the politics/expertise continuum towards the politics end.⁹ Rourke also points out that professionals are not comfortable with this "compromising" nature of their generalist manager-bosses and are much more pure in their attitudes towards decision making, which seems to describe the Yellowstone Park Preservation Council.

During the 1984-1986 controversy over tar sands development in southern Utah, professionals served a helpful function for management. The NPS and Bureau of Land Management prepared a joint environmental impact statement to help them decide whether to allow leasing of the tar sands resource. Information provided in

that document by park resource professionals was used by the NPS to oppose leasing because of the potential harm to several park units in the area. The final decision was elevated to the secretarial level, where Secretary Hodel chose to make no final decision on leasing. Mineral development is not a traditional use of most parks, but in this case the information provided by resource professionals was essential in supporting management's decision.¹⁰

When a more traditional use of parks is contemplated, the situation is rendered more ambiguous and the role of natural resource professionals is less determinant. A controversy has raged at Yellowstone over what to do with the Fishing Bridge park development which is said by wildlife biologists to be located in important grizzly habitat. Initial NPS plans to relocate most visitor facilities away from the Fishing Bridge area have been slowed and altered because of local pressure from a park gateway community and members of Congress, who feared the relocation would have had an economic impact on Cody, Wyoming, a community close to Fishing Bridge.¹¹ It is not clear whether more scientific information on the grizzly could have brought about a more preservationist decision in this case. The Fishing Bridge example suggests that scientists and resource professionals are more helpful in some situations than in others. They are most useful when resources are clearly threatened, either by outside activities or by attempts to expand park uses greatly, or when a preservation decision does not have an obvious

impact on traditional park use. Experts may be of less value when their expertise cannot clearly resolve a choice between use and preservation.

What should usually be seen, then, is park management walking the line between preservation and use because of competing signals and demands placed on them by other political actors, while they attempt to prevent the decision environment from becoming completely political. Natural resource expertise, in many cases, is simply one of many factors to be taken into account by park managers. They may favor resource protection over visitor use, but the demands placed on them by others may often preclude the public appearance of such pro-preservation sentiment. As Robert Barbee, Yellowstone's superintendent, said about Fishing Bridge: "The political bottom line was underestimated. It's as simple as that. The parks are very much the children of politics. It is naive to think that politics doesn't have an influence on policy."¹² Compromise is "not something the Park Service would have chosen," Barbee is reported to have said.¹³ The obvious question is how the Park Service can make acceptable compromises, by learning how to manage that political bottom line better.

Politics and Park Use

Cell III of Figure 1 includes decision makers and groups that are more in favor of park use and people who desire to use the political process to have their decisions "imposed" on the Park Service from outside. The use of the word "imposed" can connote a

number of different behaviors and strategies. For example, the local interests involved with the Fishing Bridge decision approached members of their congressional delegation to affect the Fishing Bridge plan. More generally, the Reagan Administration reflected the use of presidential appointment powers to locate key park policy decisions in the hands of assistant secretaries and secretaries of Interior. Many students of public administration have noted the increasing tendency of presidents to use appointees to carry out presidential policies.¹⁴ The Reagan Administration appointed administrators who favored park use over preservation, and those appointees removed some decisions from park management and located them instead at higher levels of administration, leading to the charge that it was politicizing the parks and the Park Service.¹⁵

George Hartzog, a former NPS Director, has charged that politicalization had its successful beginnings during the Carter Administration. In this case it was environmentalists appointed by Carter who were politicizing the Park Service. During Hartzog's tenure the NPS developed a "three-tiered" management policy, dividing park units into natural, historic, and recreational categories. The Carter appointees threw out these policies in favor of a single policy. To Hartzog: "Suddenly everything had become the same and, thus, nothing was any longer special—not even Yellowstone. Instead of America's great national parks as crown jewels, all areas in the system were now jewels in the crown."¹⁶

In 1988, the House of Rep-

representatives, led by congressional park policy specialists like Morris Udall (Cell IV), passed legislation which would have required that the Director of the NPS be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for a five-year term. In addition, many key functions of the Secretary were transferred to the Director's office, except the budget.¹⁷ The legislation was an attempt to address the politicizing discussed above. All of the Republican House members opposed the bill, and the Senate took no action on it.¹⁸

The Reagan Administration has allies in this pro-use, political approach to park policy. A 1987 book by Don Hummel, who was a national park concessionaire, has argued that the NPS is too preservation oriented. He decries what he feels is a "locking-up" of the parks by environmentalists and objects to their political influence on the Park Service. Hummel argues that "all National Park policies should be analyzed for anti-concession, anti-access intent and consequence."¹⁹ Because the NPS "caved in" to environmentalist pressure, according to his view, the agency "must be made to understand its legal responsibility to provide 'public use and enjoyment' of the parks for the common person and not just for the highly sensitive and elite nature lover."²⁰ One way to "make the Park Service understand" is through the use of political appointees as agency policy makers, who would presumably stress the use aspect of the NPS mission.

Politics and Park Preservation

Actors in Cell IV favor park preservation over park use, but

they also appear to favor having park decisions made through the political process. Important actors located in this cell are environmentalists. In 1983 a coalition of environmental groups declared in a major policy document that "any activity which degrades their (the parks) pristine quality is contrary to the purpose for which they were established,"²¹ Almost any activity could be prohibited under such a definition. It might be argued that this statement represents a strategic positioning on the part of these groups, taken to set off a position which they could then compromise on. Yet it is rare to find much that is supportive of park use from the environmental interest groups. In the summer of 1988, the National Parks and Conservation Association (NPCA), an environmental group whose primary focus is the national parks, objected to potential NPS development of the Needles campground area in Canyonlands National Park in Utah. The NPCA opposed enlargement of a relatively small campground and the provision of several flush toilets.²² NPCA opposition did not discuss any potential damage to park resources. This example, drawn from the margin in terms of park use versus park preservation policy, is illustrative of certain environmentalist attitudes towards visitor use of parks.

More importantly, environmentalists expect their vision of the parks to be the vision implemented and adhered to by the Park Service. To put it differently, environmentalists appear to expect and demand that the Park Service adhere to a strongly preservationist definition of proper park

policy. Foresta has stated the result of that expectation as follows:

*By stressing park management for environmental ends, and shifting new unit selection criteria toward the ecological, the agency moved the Park System's base of support away from the park-using public at large and toward the environmental public interest groups. Moreover, this shift was accompanied by a willingness on the part of the agency to accept the environmental groups as legitimate sources of guidance in park management and selection and by an unwillingness to accord the same legitimacy to the public's wishes.*²³

Yet, says Foresta, at the same time environmentalists will often "grandstand" and be hypercritical of Park Service policy and often "kick around" the agency in public, more than support agency policies with which they agree²⁴

There is a logic to stressing what Foresta calls the "environmental ends" of the national parks. If the parks, and park policy, can be redefined to focus primarily on ecosystem protection, or ecological integrity, then it becomes much easier to limit public enjoyment and use of parks. Use limitations take on the aura of scientific necessity, and the "publicness" of the parks is reduced. Many environmentalists have been uncomfortable with public use of parks, and redefining the parks' purpose helps curtail use. Thus some environmentalists have become at times enthusiastic supporters of more scientific research in parks, for reasons which may not have solely to do with scientific knowledge.

Hugh Heclo has noted the increasing tendency of American

politics to factionalize, leading to a system of government "of the activists, by the activists, and for the activists."²⁵ The danger, to Heclo, is that "a large and growing proportion of all Americans are reporting that government and politics have become so complex that they cannot understand what is going on, that decisionmaking is in the hands of interests outside their control."²⁶ Conducting a dialogue about the parks solely in the language of science and ecology may have the potential to contribute to this problem.

The NPCA issued its *National Park System Plan*, timed in part to coincide with the 1988 elections. The NPCA made a series of recommendations regarding the "preservation" side of park policy. Those recommendations included appropriating 50 million additional dollars a year for resource management, mandating annual NPS reports on park resources, creating a new research division within the NPS, and increasing scientific research in the parks.²⁷ The "use" policy recommendations were less clear. NPCA stated that "the NPS should not *continue* (emphasis added) to strive for maximum accommodation of visitors—by widening roads or enlarging parking lots—when such use exceeds park carrying capacities or impairs park resources."²⁸ Instead, the NPS should strive for providing "compatible" use which would not impair preservation. Compatible use apparently refers to a "high quality" visitor experience, something the NPCA said the Park Service was "unwilling to make value judgments" about, instead opting for recreational activities which were inappropri-

riate in the national parks.²⁹ The NPCA discussion makes no attempt to outline what it considers appropriate use of parks, leading to the conclusion that the association is more concerned with park preservation, and favors NPS decisions favoring preservation.³⁰

NPCA's solution to the problems of the parks is similar to that of some Congressional park policy specialists. The Association wants to make the Park Service an independent agency outside the Department of the Interior. The group advocates the selection of an agency Director subject to approval by the Senate, as well as the creation of a Board of Regents reflecting "business acumen, scientific expertise, and citizen preservation advocacy."³¹ The NPCA would appear to have more ability to influence park policy under such an arrangement.

NPS Director Mott requested key personnel in the agency, including regional directors and some superintendents, to forward comments on the NPCA plan to his office. What is perhaps the most notable facet of these comments is where they take issue with the NPCA plan. There are three areas of disagreement which have bearing on this article. These areas concern whether the NPS should be made an independent agency, the role of visitor use, and the role of research.

Almost all commentators, including the Director, disagreed with the suggestion that NPS be removed from the Department of the Interior. Comments ranged from supporting the "buffering" provided NPS as an Interior agency, to Director Mott's perceptive comment that "I suspect that NPCA would prefer more political

guidance from an Administration that shares your views on how parks should be managed."³² Many NPS comments also took NPCA to task for not recognizing the "use" aspect of the NPS organizational mission: "There is little concern in dealing with the issue of providing recreational opportunities. A blueprint for the future of the park system would need to provide a balanced approach between recreation and conservation for the mission of the Service."³³ The comments frequently mentioned visitor surveys showing over 90% of park visitors satisfied with park experiences,³⁴ leading one commentator to assert that "you would never know, reading the subject sections, that parks are for people also."³⁵

Finally, almost all commentators resisted the separation of research from direct linkage to park management. As one commentator noted: "By segregating research from field realities, we risk creating an 'academic' community which will be more concerned with pure research and science for its own sake than with resolution of pressing field problems."³⁶ Another commentator provided an example of the above when he noted that the separation of research from management could lead to a repeat "of the famous Isle Royale case where the research funding was studying populations of field mice when the real pressing issue at Isle Royale was the wolf-moose relationship."³⁷ Perhaps the most telling criticism came from one superintendent who noted that "this plan provides for an ideal park system with unlimited funding and free of economic,

political, and social restraints."³⁸

The Future of Park Policy

What, then, might be the future of park policy? Will it be focused on preservation or on use, and who will be the actors who have the most control over that policy? Analysis may reasonably start with the role of the Park Service, as it is in charge of managing the parks. The NPS faces two questions when it comes to park policy. One has to do with whether the agency will manage more for preservation or more for use. The second is how to sustain *whatever* policy decision the agency chooses to make, whether it be focused on use or on preservation.

In 1988, the Park Service revised its management policies for the first time since 1978. These policies, currently in draft form, include a general statement on the use/preservation management question. If one simply reads the draft policies, however, an incomplete picture emerges of what must have been an important policy battle.

A 1986 internal "draft" of the 1988 draft management policies stated that "National Park policy holds that the 1916 Organic Act refers (not once but twice) to a singular "purpose...to conserve," with the stipulation that the Service will provide for the enjoyment of areas in a manner that does not "impair" them."³⁹ This statement in the draft was reviewed by Assistant Secretary William Horn, who responded quite emphatically to it in notes written in the margin of the document. Horn commented that "as a lawyer, I would disagree with this. The law is straight-

forward. Conserve and provide enjoyment does not impair the *conserve objective*." He went on to say that "enjoyment is an *objective*...not a mere stipulation." Someone in the NPS was apparently trying to redefine the relative positions of use and preservation within the park system, something with which Assistant Secretary Horn, a political appointee, disagreed.⁴⁰

The rewritten draft management policies do not reflect the subordination of use to preservation. Rather, the NPS appears to have returned to the more traditional "weighing" of the two management tasks facing the agency.

Only in those instances when impairment is a consequence of current activity does the conservation mandate take precedence.

There will inevitably be some tension between conservation of the resource and the public use and enjoyment of the resource.

*...if a development might irreparably damage an established park resource, the development will be postponed or reconfigured until it can be established whether "might" is "will" or "will not" within reasonable limits of certainty. Absent that assurance, the action will not be taken.*⁴¹

Each park unit is to be managed under both its specific enabling legislation and under the Organic Act. Thus NPS policy regarding use and preservation is to be a policy of some tension and some judgment, with use an equal management task to preservation.

The next question which arises is whether NPS decisions will be made solely by the agency or

partly within the agency and partly by other actors. Another way to state this question is to ask whether the NPS fits the model of an agency which has a great deal of control over most of its decisions. A recent example of such an agency is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) during the 1960s. NASA was given a specific, technologically based task to accomplish (landing a man on the moon), and the rest of the political system appeared to defer to NASA on how to accomplish that task.⁴² Romzek and Dubnick describe NASA as having what they term a "professional accountability" system during the 1960s. Under this system, "the central relationship is similar to that found between a layperson and an expert, with the agency manager taking the role of the layperson and the workers making the important decisions that require their expertise."⁴³

It is doubtful that the NPS fits the model of such an agency. If the agency task were to manage parks as scientific research preserves, without the additional task of providing for public use, such a deference to expertise might be possible, if not desirable. But that is not the mission of the Park Service. The celebrated American writer Wallace Stegner has suggested what the mission of the Park Service is about. Parks are, he says, "absolutely American, absolutely democratic, they reflect us at our best. Without them millions of American lives would have been poorer."⁴⁴

What does Stegner's phrase mean in terms of public policy and the NPS mission? It means that the Park Service is not an expert

agency but more of a responsive one. A responsive agency, in the words of Romzek and Dubnick, is concerned with questions of representation, access, and responsiveness to public demands. "The potential constituencies include the general public, elected officials, agency heads, agency clientele, other special interest groups, and future generations. Regardless of which definition of constituency is adopted, the administrator is expected to be responsive to their policy priorities and programmatic needs."⁴⁵ This type of agency they define as "politically accountable" rather than professionally accountable.⁴⁶ Such an agency is thus squarely within Stegner's definition of parks as "absolutely democratic."

The NPS might do well to be constantly on the lookout for managers who understand the role of such a responsive, politically accountable agency. Being able to sustain decisions for a responsive agency may have more to do with building consensus among the agency's constituencies than with dominant reliance on science and expertise. Science and expertise are tools for a manager in building consensus, not ends in themselves.

Building consensus is hard, but not impossible. For the Park Service, consensus building should start from the understanding that national parks are essentially *public* spaces. It thus behooves the NPS to try to engage the public to participate in decisions about the parks. The NPS has done this at times in the past; the management plan for Yosemite was written with extensive public involvement.⁴⁷

Yet, more is possible for the Park Service. Charles Reich has

argued that it is the role of the public administrator to help the public deliberate over difficult policy choices. "Rather than view debate and controversy as managerial failures that make policy-making and implementation more difficult, the public administrator should see them as natural and desirable aspects of the formation of public values, contributing to society's self-understanding."⁴⁸ Thus, "the adroit public administrator can carefully select concrete local examples to set the stage for a national debate over difficult value-laden policy choices."⁴⁹ Park managers could set the park policy stage by presenting their visitors with the difficult choices that they must make as managers.

In conclusion, national park policy will continue to be decided in the political arena. The parks mean too many things to too many different groups and individuals to expect that this should be otherwise, as the policy continuums indicate. The best hope for the parks could lie with the Park Service, if it can revitalize the political skills and resources to go along with its increasing development of natural resource management skills. There are no easy prescriptions on how to do this, but there are role models in past agency directors, such as Stephen Mather, Horace Albright, and George Hartzog, among others. As Hartzog has noted, an NPS director must possess "managerial skills, awareness of park values, respect for scientific knowledge, appreciation of professional integrity and a lively understanding of politics—that medium through which the public gets its common business done."⁵⁰

The Park Service stands in the

middle of the sometimes shrill debate between environmentalists and user interests over the purpose of the parks. Yet this stance also provides opportunities. As Stephen Bailey once wrote:

Public servants are always faced with making decisions based upon imperfect information and the inarticulate insinuations of self-interest into the decisional calculus. Charity is the virtue which compensates for inadequate information and for the importunities of self in the making of judgments designed to be fair.....Its exercise makes of compromise not a sinister barter but a recognition of the dignity of competing claimants. It fortifies the persuasive rather than the coercive arts. It stimulates the visions of the good society without which government becomes a sullen defense of existing patterns of privilege.⁵¹

Park Service employees who take Bailey's advice to heart have the opportunity to provide parks truly for all.

Notes

1. J. Douglas Wellman, *Wildland Recreation Policy* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1987) pp. 117-120 and Craig Allin, "Wilderness Preservation as a Bureaucratic Tool," in Phillip Foss, ed., *Federal Lands Policy* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987).
2. Although there are excellent histories of the Park Service's early days, none of those histories examine the question of intent of the 1916 Organic Act. For a thoughtful disussion of how some people may have viewed use and preservation in an earlier period see Joseph Sax, *Mountains Without Handrails* (Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 1980). Sax discusses the ideas of Frederick Law Olmstead, architect of Central Park, who wrote a

- management plan for Yosemite in 1865. Olmstead is the father of the man given credit for authoring the key passage of the 1916 NPS Organic Act, Frederick Law Olmstead, Jr.
3. Francis Rourke, *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy* (New York: Little Brown, 1984), pp. 15-44.
 4. *Idem.* For an interesting discussion of Rourke's theory as applied to seven natural resource agencies, see Jeanne Clarke and Daniel McCool, *Staking Out the Terrain* (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1985).
 5. William Brown, "Preamble Grist," *The George Wright Forum* 5(2):8-23 (1987).
 6. George Stankey, et al., "The Limits of Acceptable Change Concept for Wilderness Planning" (Ogden, UT: United States Forest Service, 1985).
 7. Wellman, p. 264.
 8. Katharine Collins, "Park Employees Buck Their Boss," *High Country News* (May 12, 1986), p.4.
 9. Rourke, p. 134.
 10. John Freemuth, "The Politics of External Threats: Visibility, Mining and the National Parks," PhD. dissertation, (Fort Collins, CO: Colorado State University, 1986).
 11. Rocky Barker, "Fishing Bridge Decision Pleases Cody, Politicians," *High Country News* (Nov. 9, 1986), p.16.
 12. *Idem.*
 13. *Idem.*
 14. See for example, Terry Moe, "The Politicized Presidency," in Chubb and Peterson, *The New Direction in American Politics* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1985), pp.235-272; "Mandates or Mandarins? Control and Discretion in the Modern Administrative State," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 48, (March/April 1988), pp.606-612; Charles Levine, "The Federal Government in the Year 2000: Administrative Legacies of the Reagan Years," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 46, (May/June 1986), pp.195-206; Robert Durant, "Towards Assessing the Administrative Presidency: Public Lands, the BLM, and the Reagan Administration," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 47, (March/April 1987), pp.180-189; and James Pfiffner, "Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democracy—Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 47, (January/February, 1987), pp.57-66; and Patricia Ingraham and Carolyn Ban, "Models of Public Management: Are They Useful to Federal Managers in the 1980s?" *Public Administration Review*, vol. 46, (March/April 1986), pp.152-160.
 15. Robert Cahn, "Takeover at the Park Service," *National Parks* (March/April, 1987), p.53.
 16. George Hartzog, *Battling for the National Parks* (Mt. Kisco, NY: Moyer Bell, 1988), p.254.
 17. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, "Establishing a National Park System Review Board, and for Other Purposes" (House Report 100-742) June 30, 1988. There have always been members of Congress who have taken special interest in national park policy. They cannot all be viewed as "dictating" park policy to the Park Service, but many can be viewed as being very concerned with the protection of park resources, such as Senator John Chafee of Rhode Island and the now-retired Congressman John Seiberling of Ohio.
 18. *Ibid.*, p.10-11.
 19. Hummel, p.375.
 20. *Ibid.*, p.379.
 21. National Parks and Conservation Association and the Wilderness Society, *Towards a Premier National Park System*, (mimeo copy 1984), p.5. In the December 5, 1988 issue of *High Country News* the argument surfaces again. George Frampton, President of the Wilderness Society asserts that the Organic Act "says that the Service (NPS) should conserve resources so as to leave them unimpaired, and that unfortunately the Service is not now meeting that mandate."
 22. National Parks and Conservation Association, "Alert," June, 1988.
 23. Ronald Foresta, *America's National Parks and Their Keepers*, (Washing-

- ton:Resources for the Future, 1984), p.121.
24. *Ibid.*, p.122.
 25. Hugh Heclo, "The Emerging Regime," in Richard Harris and Sidney Milkis, *Remaking American Politics* (Boulder, CO:Westview Press, 1988), p.311.
 26. *Ibid.*, p.312
 27. NPCA, *National Park System Plan: Executive Summary*, pp.2-8.
 28. *Ibid.*, p.13.
 29. *Idem.*
 30. Consult Joseph Sax's *Mountains Without Handrails* for this discussion.
 31. "National Park System Plan" pp.38-44.
 32. Letter from NPS Director Mott to Paul Pritchard, President of NPCA, contained in the comment file on the NPCA *National Park System Plan*, Office of Policy, NPS, Washington, DC, and comments of the Superintendent, Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks, in comment file.
 33. Comments of the Regional Director, North Atlantic Region, NPS, in comment file.
 34. Various comments of NPS personnel, in comment file.
 35. Comments of the Chief, Ranger Activities Division, NPS, in comment file.
 36. Comments of the Superintendent, Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks, NPS, in comment file.
 37. Comments of the Superintendent, Lassen Volcanic National Park, NPS, in comment file.
 38. National Park Service, *Management Policies* (mimeo copy of agency draft 1986) p.7.
 39. *Idem.*
 40. National Park Service, *Management Policies*, (public draft 1988), p.1:4.
 41. Barbara Romzek and Melvin Dubnick, "Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 46 (May/June 1986) p.229.
 42. *Ibid.*, p.227.
 43. Wallace Stegner, "The Best Idea We Ever Had," *Wilderness* vol. 46 (Spring 1983) p.4.
 44. Romzek and Dubnick, p.229.
 45. *Idem.*
 46. Hartzog, p.273-74.
 47. Wellman, p.221-228.
 48. Robert Reich, "Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay," *Yale Law Journal* vol. 94, (June, 1985) p.1637.
 49. *Ibid.*, p.1638.
 50. Stephen Bailey, "Ethics and the Public Service," in Richard Stillman *Public Administration*, 4th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1988), p.472.



Potpourri

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International Perspectives on Cultural Parks

GWS member (and former GWS President) Doug Scovill has sent Forum a copy of "International Perspectives on Cultural Parks," which was sent to him by Robert C. Heyder, Superintendent, Mesa Verde, with the following note:

"The George Wright Society was an important contributor to the funding and success of the First World Conference on Cultural Parks which was held at Mesa Verde National Park between September 16 and 21 of 1984. The publication of the proceedings of the Conference officially brings the conference to a close. We have enclosed a copy of the proceedings for your library....."

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Society Notes and Notices

Amendment to the Society's By-Laws

At the meeting of the Society's Board of Directors in Tucson in November 1988, a determination was made to amend the Society's By-Laws to allow the formation of Sections within the Society which would accommodate specializations of various kinds. The immediate stimulus for this was the desire of a number of resources management members of the Society to form such a section. The by-laws already address the formation of "Local Chapter Affiliates" (Article V—Membership—Section 6). In keeping with the decision of the Board, therefore, an amendment now has been drafted to permit such sections to be formed.

Article XVI—Amendments to the By-Laws—states: *Amendments or additions to the By-Laws may be made with a simple majority vote of the Board of Directors favoring the change, provided the membership has been informed of the anticipated change 60 days prior to the Board of Directors' action.*

This constitutes, then, the 60 days notice to the membership of a proposed amendment to the by-laws, as follows:

Proposed Amendment to Article V—Membership— of the By-Laws of The George Wright Society

«Section 7. Sections.

Members of the Society may form sections to promote the professional interests of the Society.»

Our Glaring Error

Volume 6, Number 1 of *The George Wright FORUM*, mailed to members in April 1989, states in large bold letters on the cover:

"Volume 6 ♦ 1989 ♦ Number 4"

Please change your copy to read—

"Volume 6 ♦ 1989 ♦ Number 1"

Your publisher's face has been red about this, but, well, he'll have to leave it to you to correct his mistake on your copy. My apologies!

....RML

The FORUM Uses Paper, Too!

Every Sunday, more than 500,000 trees are used to produce the 88% of newspapers that are never recycled—states the Environmental Defense Fund. Meanwhile: landfills are at or over fill-capacity; dioxines (which are extremely toxic) are produced in the pulp bleaching process which then go on to pollute our environment (especially our already overtaxed water supplies); and we, as a society, continue the habit of just putting out the trash to be "taken away" (but it just doesn't go away very far).

The *Forum*, in just the first three numbers of Volume 6, has used approximately 43,000 sheets of 9" x 12" paper. Compared to the Sunday *New York Times*, that's not much; but it's still a lot. Hopefully, most copies of *Forum* are keepers, but they won't be kept forever and will eventually be "thrown away." If you don't keep your copies, we'd appreciate it very much if you could contribute them to some form of recycling effort—usually a local effort, only rarely mandatory. The glossy cover may not be recyclable in some localities, but the inside pages are. Better yet, return unwanted copies to us for use as back-issue copies available for those who may wish to have them in the future.

We are currently exploring the use of recycled paper for the production of *Forum*. If there's no demand for recycled paper, not much paper will be recycled, and we feel it's important for us to assist in creating that demand—even if we are a pretty small user.

There are all kinds and grades of recycled paper, so it may take us awhile to come up with something suitable. The sheet you're reading this on (and the announcement of the 1990 Conference at the beginning of this number) is the most "environmentally safe" paper that we know of: it's made of 100% recycled paper, no toxic substances are used or produced in the de-inking, it hasn't been bleached with chlorine—thus averting the production of chloroform and dioxines, and it's acid-free—thus assuring that it won't become brittle on your shelf. We'll continue exploring the possibilities and will keep you informed. Your comments on the occasional sample, such as this one, will be highly valued.

.....RML

Potpourri

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The 408 page volume contains summaries of the three conference themes with 75 papers addressing those themes, and a section on Resolutions and Recommendations. The papers, which are worldwide in scope, are given in English—with English, Spanish and French summaries. Theme summaries are in all three languages.

Doug Scovill's note: "*The attached 'Proceedings' came to the Society at my address. During my tenure as President, we had made a modest contribution to the conference.*"

"*Our members may write to Mr. Robert C. Heyder, Superintendent, Mesa Verde National Park, Colorado 81330 and request a copy. There is no charge.....*"

Submissions to Forum

Preferably double-spaced typewritten or similar legible word processor. Please use clear, sharp, reasonably intense image. May also be submitted on Macintosh 3.5" disk—400 or 800K, or on MS-DOS 5.25" disk. Please label disk as to word processor used and please also send an accompanying hard copy printout. Illustrations may be submitted as hard copy line or photographic prints; negatives and positive transparencies are acceptable when there's no other choice. Please furnish address and telephone where normally the author can be reached, and professional affiliation and title when appropriate. Send manuscripts to the Editor—see inside front cover.

Mailing

Beginning with this issue an "endorsement" (wording directly below Forum's return address on back cover) reads "Forwarding and Return Postage Guaranteed—Address Correction Requested." This means that: 1) Forum will be forwarded to you if you have a forwarding address—you will be charged the postage due; or 2) if no forwarding address, it will be returned to Forum and Forum will pay the postage due; and 3) an address change to Forum will be sent by the Postal Service, if a forwarding address is current and on file with the Postal Service, and Forum will pay 30¢ for the service. This procedure operates only for United States domestic mail. To avoid all of this paperwork and additional charges, please notify Forum immediately of any address change. Thank you.