

Holding the High Ground: Interpreting the Civil War in National Parks

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IN 2000, CONGRESS RECOGNIZED THAT THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE “does an outstanding job of . . . describing the particular battle at any given site, but in the . . . multi-media presentations, it does not always do a similarly good job of documenting and describing the historical social, economic, legal, cultural and political forces and events that originally led to the [Civil War] which eventually manifested themselves in specific battles. In particular, the Civil War battlefields are often weak or missing vital information about the role that the institution of slavery played in causing the American Civil War.” Congress further directed “the Secretary of the Interior to encourage Civil War battle sites to recognize and include in all of their public displays and multimedia educational presentations the unique role that the institution of slavery played in causing the Civil War and its role, if any, at the individual battle sites.”

National Park Service Civil War battlefield superintendents had already begun to expand interpretation in their parks starting with a meeting in Nashville, Tennessee, in 1998, in which they asked themselves the question, “How do we go about expanding the scope of interpretation on Civil War battlefields, giving visitors the opportunity to explore the fundamental contexts and meanings of the resources that comprise Civil War battlefields?” In the ten years since, we have made great progress in meeting our charge from Congress, by interpreting not only the issue of slavery, but other causal themes as well. As we approach the Sesquicentennial of the Civil War, our goal is to make our parks laboratories for exploring and understanding this critical period in our history.

“After four years of arduous service marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.”

With this farewell address to his troops at Appomattox Courthouse in April 1865, General Robert E. Lee started what we have since called the conception, or the myth, of

the “lost cause” of the Civil War. Simply stated, the lost cause was a viewpoint of the war, perpetuated by Confederate veterans, that the Confederacy was engaged in a noble war, fought by honorable men, to defend the cause of states’ rights. The South lost, not because the cause was wrong—the proponents believed it was just—nor because the officers and soldiers were inferior—in their eyes, they were superior. They lost because they faced insur-

mountable odds of more manpower and more industrial might—in fact, more of virtually everything.

Lee's Farewell Address and the body of literature that ensued, beginning with Edward Pollard's 1865 book *The Lost Cause: A New Southern History of the War of the Confederates*, followed by a second volume in 1866, *The Lost Cause Regained*, perpetuated and engrained the lost cause in the Southern and, later, Northern psyche. Pollard and others influenced the content of textbooks, and by adopting an activist approach to curricular planning these Confederate sympathizers were able to perpetuate the lost cause for generations beyond the end of the Civil War.¹

In many ways, the idea of the lost cause made perfect sense. Indeed, there were more Northerners than Southerners. There were more factories in the North than in the South. There were more railroads in the North. Indeed, the North had more of most everything. So, was General Lee correct in his assessment?²

Throughout history, there have been many instances in which the smaller army defeated the larger army. In the American Revolutionary War, the Americans defeated Great Britain, which outnumbered and outproduced them, and, in fact, had more of just about everything, but still lost the war. In the 1860s, Paraguay fought a war with Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil and nearly won, but lost not only the war, but much of its male population, and about half its entire population. Americans are still trying to come to grips with the fact that we lost the war in Vietnam, despite the fact that we were the richest nation in the world.² Smaller armies certainly do not win all of the time, but often enough to be noteworthy.

Although the Confederate states had the smaller population and army, they had many advantages, such as fighting much of the war on their home ground, with the critical advantage of internal supply lines. The South had some of the most fertile land in the country, yet the government was never truly able to shift its cotton-growing economy to large-scale food production, with an adequate distribution system from areas of abundance to areas of need. Further, the Confederate government was a true confederacy, in which each state was sovereign. States were asked to contribute money, rather than there being a mandatory taxing system, so money was scarce and highly inflated.

For years, historians have debated why the North won. In a new book, *This Mighty Scourge*, leading Civil War historian, James M. McPherson, examines recent scholarship on why the North won. Multiple reasons from social, economic, political, and military perspectives contributed to the Southern loss and the Northern victory.³ As one example, recent scholarship suggests that the desertion rate, especially among Confederates, drained the army and provided strong evidence that many Confederates lost the will to fight. Tied to that, many wives implored their husbands who were off fighting to come home. Many heard the siren calls, and came home.⁴

Another significant factor was the addition of African American troops on the Union side at the critical juncture late in the war. Toward the end of the war, over 200,000 black troops swelled the numbers in the Union army at a time when both armies were in desperate need of more soldiers. For these African American soldiers, the stakes were high. Many were former slaves, and nearly all saw their mission as bringing an

end to the institution of slavery. The risks were higher for these men than their white colleagues. If they surrendered, they would face being sold into slavery, or, worse yet, massacred, such as what happened at Fort Pillow in Tennessee, an incident in which 80% of the black soldiers were killed.⁵ Because the Confederates refused to consider blacks as prisoners of war, the prisoner exchange system that prevailed early in the war broke down, leading to the establishment of the infamous prisoner-of-war camps. As the war progressed, however, an important philosophical shift became evident. White soldiers began to understand the risks black soldiers faced, and when they saw how they fought—like furies—many who were indifferent to slavery now came to accept the cause of ending the institution.⁶

For generations, National Park Service interpreters and managers have deftly skirted such issues as why the North won the Civil War. Some academic historians have criticized us for telling “symbolic history” or “institutional” history, rather than wrestling with substantive issues such as why the North won.⁷ Historians in the academy and the Park Service present their work to different audiences and for different purposes. Academics disseminate their work primarily to their peers, while Park Service historians present their work to millions of visitors with a wide variety of interests, knowledge, and educational backgrounds. Both academic and Park Service historians, however, seek to enlighten their audiences with the most accurate and insightful information available.

Park Service historians sometimes have a further restraint on what they present to their audiences. Many of our military parks, starting with the first one created by

Congress—Chickamauga–Chattanooga in Georgia and Tennessee—were set aside with specific legislation that directed the War Department, which was the first manager of this park, to commemorate the battles fought there and the brave soldiers who gave their lives on that sacred ground. Furthermore, these parks were to be used as laboratories to study the military actions that took place there.⁸ Thus, when this and other military parks were transferred to the National Park Service, staff avoided both the issue of why the North won, and a great deal of controversy, by focusing on the military history of the Civil War.

“Chit-Chat,” as we call Chickamauga–Chattanooga National Military Park, is actually a wonderful park for discussing military history. On the final day of the battle of Chickamauga, General William S. Rosecrans, the Union commander, moved a division from his line to cover what one of his aides thought was a hole in another part of the line. As it turned out, there really was not a gap; the aide simply could not see the Union troops in the tree cover. But by moving this division, Rosecrans created a real hole in the line, which, under normal circumstances, would have been plugged within minutes. Commanders and their aides always checked to make sure that there were no gaps in the line, or, to use the terminology of the day, to ensure that none of the regiments or divisions were “in the air.” Yet, at that moment, at that very spot, and by total coincidence, Confederate General James Longstreet unleashed an attack, not knowing that the point of attack was uncovered. In the ensuing melee, and in what could have been a disastrous Union defeat, Union General George Thomas held his strong defensive position behind the front lines, allowing most of the Union

army to retreat north to Chattanooga. Thomas' stand, and the fact that he averted a complete disaster, earned him the nickname of the "Rock of Chickamauga."⁹

The discussion of commanders is an important topic of traditional military history. National Park Service interpreters have covered with excellence over the years. For example, we have looked at General Rosecrans, whose career went into a downward spiral after the battle. The blame for the defeat was heaped on his shoulders, while Confederate General Longstreet was considered a hero for breaking through the Union line. Ultimately, he was a flawed hero because he was not able to capture the Union army. General Thomas, on the other hand, achieved heroic status because he held off the Confederates long enough for the Union army to retreat. George Thomas actually deserved attention beyond his military prowess, and is one of the most fascinating officers in the Civil War. He was one of the few U.S. Army officers from before the Civil War who opted to stay with the Union Army, although he was from Virginia. In fact, as a teenager, he helped his family escape the Nat Turner Slave Revolt in Southampton, Virginia.¹⁰ By deciding to stay in the Union, however, his family disowned him, turned his pictures to the wall, and refused assistance from Thomas before his death in 1870, and from his friends later. Thomas' family, who owned more than 20 slaves, was among the elite of Southern slave-holding families. Yet, after the war, Thomas became a strong advocate for African Americans, having seen how the black soldiers under his command fought. Thomas Circle, a national park area in Washington, D.C., is named for him, with a monument in his honor.¹¹

National Park Service historians and interpreters will never stray from the core mission of discussing the strategies, tactics, and results of the battles, as well as the commanders on each side. These stories are and will always be popular and important with our visitors. Over 11 million visit our Civil War parks each year, and most are there to learn about the fighting that took place there. But, we also need to keep current with the evolving military historiography to best serve our visitors, and while it is important to understand the successes and failures of the commanders, it is equally important to know about the participants on the ground—the common soldiers—who were far more concerned about killing or being killed in the battle than whether or not their commanders were effective. Thirty years ago, the brilliant British military historian, Sir John Keegan, wrote *The Face of Battle*, which focused attention on common soldiers and their perceptions of battle, and how these often differed from the perceptions of their commanders.¹²

To illustrate this point, let's return to Chit-Chat for a moment. Ambrose Bierce, one of our most important literary figures from the 1800s, participated in the battle at Chickamauga, having recently been promoted to first lieutenant in the Union army. After the war, Bierce would write a fictional short story—*Chickamauga*—describing in graphic detail the horrors of war. Much later, in 1898, after Chickamauga became a military park, Bierce reflected that "on that historic ground occurred the fiercest and bloodiest of all the great conflicts of modern times—a conflict in which skill, valor, accident and fate played each its important parts; the result a tactical victory for one side, a strategic one for the other."¹³ In

describing the carnage of the battle, Bierce never mentioned the commanders.

In some battles, it seemed that the commanders were describing entirely different battles than their soldiers. For example, as General William T. Sherman was marching through Georgia, there was a small, strategically unimportant battle in the town of Milledgeville, the state capital of Georgia at the time. Sherman barely discusses the battle in his reports and *Memoirs*, but he wrote a humorous piece about some of his young officers who took over the state House of Representatives. After a spirited debate, they repealed the ordinance of secession, and called for the governor and Jefferson Davis to appear to receive kicks in their rear ends.¹⁴

Yet, the soldiers who actually fought in this battle had quite different descriptions of Milledgeville. Union soldiers marched into town and saw a heavy column of infantry marching toward them. They fired, the Confederate column retreated, then attacked again and again. The Union soldiers fired again and again, resulting in about 600 Confederate casualties. But, what the Union soldiers discovered was that most of the soldiers were old men or young boys. One Union soldier wrote: "I was never so affected at the sight of dead and wounded before. I hope we will never have to shoot at such men again." Another wrote, "There is no god in war. It is merciless, cruel, and vindictive, un-Christian, savage, relentless. It is all that devils could wish for."¹⁵

Providing a broader interpretation of military history is an area we believe provides an important service to our visitors. The military history, however, is only one aspect of the Civil War era. Many of us who

manage National Park Service Civil War battlefields began to recognize that we were doing our customers a disservice by only telling the military part of the Civil War story. At a meeting of National Park Service superintendents in Nashville, Tennessee, in 1998, we wrestled with how we interpret battles along with other management issues, such as roads in the parks, managing resources, and dealing with the land surrounding parks. In part, we looked at expanding our interpretation at the behest of Congressman Jesse Jackson, Jr., who had recently visited a number of our parks and was troubled by the focus on military history to the exclusion of other topics, such as slavery.¹⁶

We decided a new goal would be to address slavery as the main cause of the Civil War. Now, let's return for a moment to the comparison we made earlier between academic and National Park Service historians. Academic historians generally can write or stand in front of a class and say that slavery was the cause of the Civil War, without worrying about any repercussions. One of our superintendents, on the other hand, reported that he gave a speech in which he mentioned that slavery "might" have been a cause of the Civil War, and within a few weeks, 1,100 cards and letters were sent to the secretary of the interior demanding that he either resign or be fired. Another superintendent reported that a modern pro-Confederate group, which at one time had owned the park he managed, was raising money to bring a lawsuit to regain ownership of the park from the "corrupt and anti-confederate National Park Service." This reaction was a result of expanded interpretation at his park, addressing slavery and other causes of the Civil War. Not everyone

agrees with the notion that slavery caused the war; thus, we need to strike a balance among the 300 million “shareholders”—the American public—who own our parks. We need to make absolutely sure that when we make a statement like “slavery was the principal cause of the Civil War,” we are basing that statement on the best scholarship available, because some of our “owners” aren’t going to like it.

It is important to ensure the accuracy of our stories; it is equally important that we provide our interpreters with the best tools available to present this information. To that end, in 2000, we obtained a grant to sponsor a symposium at Ford’s Theater, to which we brought the leading scholars of the Civil War period, to discuss the most recent interpretations of this era with our superintendents, interpreters, and the general public. All 700 seats in Ford’s Theater were full for most of the sessions, C-Span broadcast most of the presentations, and we published the papers. Several months later, we sponsored an intensive two-week institute to train interpreters from our Civil War parks on how to expand their programs.¹⁷

One of the most important questions we explored at Ford’s Theater and at our institute was the causes of the Civil War, encouraging our interpreters to draw their own conclusions. Obviously, there were many causes—political, economic, and social—which are all correct. But, why was the political cause such that it would lead to a civil war? Why was the economic issue so important? Or, why was the social cause of such consequence that it would lead to the Civil War? Nearly everyone concluded that all of these causes had a root cause, and that was the institution of slavery. In many ways, the causes of the Civil War were like peeling an onion. One layer of the onion was poli-

tics; another was economics; and yet another was social issues. Once all of these layers were removed, the core was the institution of slavery. If slavery was the root cause of the Civil War, what was the institution like?

One of the historians who spoke at our symposium, Ira Berlin, from the University of Maryland, said slavery had two parts. On the one hand, it was the most inhumane, shameful, demeaning, and sadistic treatment ever meted out to any Americans. Husbands were separated from wives, and children were removed from their parents. It brutalized people, physically and psychologically. But, as Professor Berlin notes, slaves did not surrender to their plight. They created niches for family life, religious worship, education, and formal and informal associations, as well as a unique culture, cuisine, language, and music. “Indeed,” as Professor Berlin said, “the creative legacy of slavery is so great that we must concede that if slavery is the darkest part of America’s past, it may also be the most creative part of America’s past.”¹⁸

The economy of slavery was an important part of the equation. In 1860, there were approximately four million slaves in the United States. About 30%, or 385,000, of the white population in slave states owned slaves, and of that number 12% owned 20 or more slaves. About 30% of the nation’s population lived in the South, but 60% of the wealthiest individuals were concentrated in the South. Further, the per capita income in the South was nearly double that in the North. To place these figures in more modern terms, in the 1950s only 2% of American families owned corporation stocks equal to the value of one slave in 1860.¹⁹ To carry these statistics a little further, the value of slaves in the United States—again in 1860—was valued at about

\$3 billion, which was greater than the combined value of railroads, factories, and banks in the entire country, and greater than all land, cotton, and goods in the South. So, the economic value of slaves on the eve of the Civil War was considerable.

As much as the economics of slavery were important, slavery also created a very tight social caste system with large plantation owners at the top, and slaves at the bottom, and little opportunity for movement in any direction. Slavery also had a powerful impact on local and national politics.

So, it's not surprising that when the South left the Union, in nearly all of the secession documents a principal reason listed was the protection of the "peculiar institution." Yet, the Confederate government seldom made any reference to slavery in its official documents. After the war, lost cause advocates always said liberty, rights, and justice were the reasons for the war, and never mentioned the protection of slavery as a cause. Given the tremendous value of slaves, it made perfect sense that the primary reason for the war would be to protect property.

The American Civil War had a tremendous impact on families. Women, especially in slave-owning families in the South, assumed the responsibilities of feeding their families and managing their slaves while their husbands were away at the war. After the war, over 600,000 men did not come home, and many who did return were missing limbs, sick with diseases they contracted during battle, and suffering from poorly understood psychological impediments, now known as post-traumatic shock.

Many of us have stories in our families of ancestors who were participants in the war. A large number of our visitors come to our battlefields to walk on the sacred

ground where their ancestors fought. Others use the tools we have available in our parks and on the Internet to trace their family stories.²⁰ In my family, a story was passed down that my great-grandfather, who was in the Kansas cavalry, died at a young age from complications of four bullet wounds sustained during the war. Digging a little deeper, I found that his regiment actually was never engaged in a battle, that he was never shot, and that, instead, he contracted dysentery while in the army. His family was able to collect a pension when he died. Yet, even though the family collected a pension, the loss of the principal breadwinner must have been difficult.

Equally, what made soldiers, most of whom had never fired a gun at anything but game, become killers of other men? From the descriptions of soldiers who fought, we know that early in the war most believed they were fighting for either the cause of preserving the Union (in the North) or protecting their rights (in the South). As the war dragged on, especially after the Emancipation Proclamation, war aims in the North changed. When one reads the letters and diaries of soldiers, it is not uncommon to read early in the war that many Union soldiers wanted nothing to do with fighting a war to end slavery. But after they saw how slaves were treated, and actually met slaves who escaped to the Union lines, many realized that the cause of ending slavery was just and worth the fight.²¹

Again, returning to the comparison between academic and National Park Service historians, we have an enormous advantage that academics can never duplicate. We tell our stories on the ground where the stories happened, and over the years, we have become very skilled at transporting our visitors back in time to the

events that took place on that ground. Not every issue is appropriate for every park. For example, African American soldiers did not fight at either First or Second Manassas, so we probably would not focus on that story there. But, since slavery was the principal cause of the Civil War, and since First Manassas was the first major land battle of the war, the park's interpretation deals with slavery as the reason this battle and the war took place. Further, a slave from a farm near Manassas escaped to Union lines, joined the Union Army, fought, then returned to the area as a free man, purchased land in what is now the park, and raised his family there.

A major story at Antietam has always been that the 23,000-plus casualties in the battle on September 17, 1862, was the greatest loss of life in one day in American military history. A huge photograph, taken the day after the battle, hangs on the wall in the visitor center, graphically depicting the carnage. Equally important as the military story of the battle of Antietam, however, was President Lincoln's issuance of the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation and the decision of Great Britain not to recognize the Confederacy, an action which was very close to fruition just before the battle.

Fort Pulaski, protecting the harbor of Savannah, Georgia, has an enormously interesting military story, in which Union forces fired on the fort with field artillery from a sand-spit across the harbor, forcing the Confederate surrender after the walls were breached, threatening the powder magazine in the fort. This demonstrated to the satisfaction of many military historians that masonry forts were obsolete. An equally compelling story is that once the Union controlled the fort, slaves escaped from the

coastal Confederate states, and swarmed to the protection of the fort.

The most fascinating story that illustrates the value of site-based interpretation and the importance of going beyond military history comes from Fredericksburg. This story is shared by John Hennessy, the historian at Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania County Battlefields Memorial National Military Park.

On April 18, 1862, the Union Army congregated near Fredericksburg, stayed there for four months, and never fired a shot in anger during that time. Two individuals observed exactly the same event on the same day, in the same place, but their perspectives could not have been more different. Their observations had nothing to do with the actual fighting. Helen Bernard was a white woman living just outside Fredericksburg; John Washington was a slave living in the town. David Blight recently published Washington's narrative in *A Slave No More*.²²

Helen Bernard, 1862. "I write while the smoke of the burning bridges, depot, & boats, is resting like a heavy cloud all around the horizons towards Fredcksbg. The enemy [the Union army] are in possession of Falmouth, our force on this side too weak to resist them.... We are not at all frightened but stunned & bewildered waiting for the end. Will they shell Fbg., will our homes on the river be all destroyed?... It is heartsickening to think of having our beautiful valley that we have so loved and admired all overrun & desolated by our bitter enemies, whose sole object is to subjugate & plunder the South...."

John Washington, April 18th, 1862. "Was 'Good-Friday,' the Day was a mild pleasant one with the Sun Shining brightly,

and every thing unusually quiet ... until every body Was Startled by Several reports of [Yankee] cannon. . . . In less time than it takes me to write these lines, every White man was out the house. [But] every Man Servant was out on the house top looking over the River at the yankees, for their glistening bayonats could eaziely be Seen. I could not begin to express my new born hopes for I felt . . . like I Was certain of My freedom now.²³

Most Civil War battlefields have stories similar to this one from Fredericksburg, stories that weave a rich fabric, and often have little to do with the actual fighting. Our parks are incorporating these stories into their interpretive programs.²⁴ We have not had the opportunity to gauge how many parks have expanded their interpretation,

nor how the public has received our new programs, by any scientific measurements. A number of our parks with new visitor centers or new exhibits have incorporated subjects such as slavery as a cause of the Civil War into their programs. Others have developed special interpretive stories that go beyond traditional military history. From letters and emails we receive, we know that many visitors like what we are doing, and that some do not. We have, however, started on a course from which we do not intend to deviate. Into the Sesquicentennial of the Civil War and beyond, we will continue to wrestle with issues, such as the causes of the Civil War, so that our visitors will contemplate and better understand who we are as a people.

Endnotes

1. For a discussion of Pollard's books and the perpetuation of the lost cause in Southern literature, see James M. McPherson, *This Mighty Scourge: Perspectives on the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 93ff.
2. Christopher C. Lovett, "A Walk in the Sun: Reflections on Teaching the Vietnam War," *The History Teacher* 31 (November 1997), pp. 77–92.
3. *This Mighty Scourge*, pp. 43–63.
4. Robert K. Sutton, ed., *Rally on the High Ground: The National Park Service Symposium on the Civil War* (Fort Washington, Pa.: Eastern National, 2001), p. xiv.
5. On April 12, 1864, Confederate Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest led his cavalry against Fort Pillow, a Union fort about 40 miles north of Memphis on the Mississippi River. The fort was defended by about 600 soldiers, evenly divided between whites and African Americans. In the ensuing battle, about 40% of white Union soldiers and about 80% of African American soldiers were killed.
6. There are a host of sources on African American soldiers in the Civil War. Among these are the collection of essays edited by National Park Service historian Marty Blatt, along with Thomas J. Brown and Donald Yacovone, *Hope and Glory: Essays on the Legacy of the Massachusetts 54th Regiment* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000). For a more complete list of sources, look at James M. McPherson and William J. Cooper, Jr., eds., *Writing the Civil War: The Quest to Understand* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), especially the chapter by Peter Kolchin, "Slavery and Freedom in the Civil War South," and the endnotes for that chapter.

7. In 1988, the journal *The Public Historian* published a roundtable discussion, “Government Sponsored Research: A Sanitized Past?,” in which a panel of public historians within and outside of the National Park Service discussed an article by John Bodmer, in which he was critical of the histories published by the Park Service on the Statue of Liberty and Ellis Island. He argued that histories published by federal agencies were designed to “[erase] any record of social tensions or individual struggles” (p. 34). The discussion that followed, for the most part, defended Park Service histories, based on the context of their purposes, but one scholar suggested that sometimes these studies “are not placed within the proper context and thus their usefulness is diminished” (p. 52). David Thelen et al., “Government Sponsored Research: A Sanitized Past?” *The Public Historian* 10 (summer 1988), pp. 31–58.
8. Most military parks were managed by the War Department until 1933, when they were transferred to the National Park Service.
9. Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park has a fine website with more detail, found at www.nps.gov/chch.
10. The Nat Turner revolt took place in August 1831. Nat Turner recruited some 50 enslaved and free African Americans who went on a two-day rampage in which they killed 57 whites, and brought terror to this area of Virginia. The Turner revolt was the largest slave uprising in antebellum America, and it terrified many Southerners who feared that a larger-scale revolt could occur at any time.
11. Christopher J. Einolf, *George Thomas: Virginian for the Union* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007); Freeman Cleaves, *Rock of Chickamauga: The Life of George H. Thomas* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1986).
12. Sir John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (New York: Viking Press, 1976).
13. In Donald T. Blume, *Ambrose Bierce’s Civilians and Soldiers in Context: A Critical Study* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2004), pp. 141–142.
14. William Tecumseh Sherman, *Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman* (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1990), pp. 663–666.
15. Shelby Foote, *The Civil War: A Narrative, Red River to Appomattox* (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 646–647.
16. The proceedings from the conference were published in a report entitled “Holding the High Ground: Principles and Strategies for Managing and Interpreting Civil War Battlefield Landscapes (Proceedings of a Conference of Battlefield Managers, Nashville, TN, August 24–27, 1998).”
17. The papers from this symposium were published in Sutton, *Rally on the High Ground*.
18. Ira Berlin, “Slavery in American Life, Past, Present and Future,” in Sutton, *Rally on the High Ground*.
19. “Selected Statistics on Slavery in the United States,” compiled primarily from the Census of 1860, on-line at <http://members.aol.com/Jfeperson/stat.html>.
20. One of the services the National Park Service provides is its “Soldiers and Sailors System,” a database that includes all of the known participants in the Civil War. You can access this site at www.civilwar.nps.gov/cwss/.
21. James M. McPherson, “Citizen Soldiers of the Civil War: Why They Fought,” in *Rally*

on the High Ground; James M. McPherson, *For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

22. David W. Blight, *A Slave No More: Two Men Who Escaped to Freedom, Including Their Own Narratives of Emancipation* (New York: Harcourt, 2007).
23. Quoted in “Holding the High Ground: A National Park Service Plan for the Sesquicentennial of the Civil War” (2008).
24. The National Park Service, with a grant from the National Park Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities, has developed a website, the “War for Freedom,” that features unit guides for students to do research with original historic documents, to re-create moments of drama and personal choice, to understand the relevance of the struggle for their own lives, and to synthesize their learning and imagination in creative collaborative projects. You can access this source at www.nps.gov/features/warforfreedom/.

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